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ABSTRACT
This meta-analytic study analyses the relationship between racial prejudice and racial policy
attitudes. Specifically, it examines the effects of race attitudes (i.e., symbolic racism, old-
fashioned racism, racial affect and stereotypes) on attitudes towards racial policies such as
affirmative action, busing and fair housing laws, among others. Furthermore, the effects of
specific policy types (i.e., preferential treatment, compensatory programmes, desegregation
and general legal policies) on racial policy attitudes were also examined. Finally, as a matter
of interest, a racial attitude by racial policy type interaction was also analysed. 28 studies (N
= 187 191,216 effect sizes) were collected for analyses. Overall, results indicate that there is
in fact a statistically significant correlation between race prejudice and racial policy attitudes.
In terms of racial attitudes, all four dimensions of racial attitude types were significantly
correlated with racial policy opinions, with symbolic racism presenting the strongest
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 What is race prejudice?
As Durrheim (2003) pointed out, despite its existence over a long period, there does not seem
to be a consensual definition of the concept racism. It appears authors define it in different
ways to suit their purposes. According to Ellis (2001), race prejudice is a result of the beliefs
by white people that they are superior to the "coloured race" economically, socially and
politically. Sniderman and Piazza (1993) explain "by prejudice we mean precisely a
consistent readiness to respond negatively to a member of a group by virtue of his or her
membership in the group, with the proof of prejudice being thus the repetitiveness with which
a person endorses negative characterization after negative characterization" (p. 89). In other
words, the more frequently and consistently a person endorses negative characterizations of
blacks, the more racially prejudiced that person is.
Sears and Kinder "define racism in terms of possessing negative affect towards blacks"
(Wood, 1994, p. 676). Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991, as cited in Wood, 1994) on the
other hand define racism not merely or exclusively as a tendency by whites to view blacks
negatively, but also and importantly a tendency to treat them differently based on group
membership. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986b) also define racism as "a deep-seated, irrational
insistence on the inferiority of blacks, and contempt and hostility toward them" (p. 186).
Sears (1998) says racism can be narrowly defined "as a categorical hostility or antagonism
toward African Americans because of their race" (p. 82). Racism is, therefore, according to
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Sears, present when, everything else equal, whites still feel and act more negatively toward
blacks than other groups or individuals from other groups.
1.2 Racial policy attitudes
Racial policies, also known as race-targeted policies, are policies/measures/programmes
introduced or implemented by governments and institutions in order to eradicate past
discrimination and inequalities, hence promoting equality. Examples of such policies are
affirmative action, busing (for school integration), and fair housing laws (promoting
residential integration), to name but a few.
A simple definition of the term 'attitude' from Wikipedia
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attitude_(psychology)) explains it as "positive or negative
views of an "attitude object", i.e., a person, behaviour, or event". Schuman, Steeh, Bobo and
Krysan (1997, p. 5) define an attitude as "something that social psychologists believe to
underlie the responses expressed in actual surveys, rather than being the responses
themselves, which are a form of verbal behaviour". Wikipedia further explained that an
individual could also simultaneously possess a positive and negative attitude toward a target
(see also Durrheim & Dixon, 2004).
Although it is not clear-cut how attitudes develop, it seems like most attitudes in individuals
are a result of social learning from the environment. Being in possession of an attitude does
not necessarily translate into behaviour based on it (Wicker, 1969). In that sense, racial policy
attitudes are understood as people's views, positive or negative, towards race-targeted
policies, regardless of whether or not the attitudes are acted on. Or to put it in Krysan's
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(2000) words, "racial policy attitudes are opInIOnS about government policies that are
concerned with African Americans and other minorities" (p. 137). It can also be defmed in
terms of the support or opposition to racial policies (Krysan, 2000).
1.3 The link between race prejudice and racial policy attitudes
Recent research (see for example Schuman et at. 's 1997 survey findings) shows that racism
has decreased in the past half-century. Since the dismantling of the Jim Crow system in
America in the 1960s and the introduction of basic political and civil rights for blacks,
whites' racial attitudes have been shifting gradually to the current near unanimous support for
general principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination (Tarman & Sears, 2005).
However, even though there has been a decrease in negative racial attitudes and, therefore, a
decrease in racism, the 'new attitudes' do not seem to have transferred into behaviour. On the
one hand you have a majority of people agreeing that racial discrimination should indeed be
eradicated, hence they support the principle of equality. On the other hand, an equally large
majority oppose the practical measures implemented or put into place in order to bring about
such equality. This has resulted in what researchers have named the 'principle-
implementation gap'. This resulting worrying gap (between principle and policy) has left
researchers wondering as to what the shift in opinions really means. As Durrheim (2003) put
it, "is it simply the case that changing social norms have created stronger demands for whites
to hide their racism; and have they merely become better at disguising their negative
attitudes ... ? Or has there been a genuine shift in attitudes: have racist attitudes
disappeared ... ?" (p. 241 - 242) To date, despite many research studies done in this field,
there are still no clear or concrete answers to such questions. For the past few decades,
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researchers have been, and are still, debating heatedly among themselves as to what actually
explains the principle-implementation gap.
In one camp, advocates of non-racial explanations argue that racism no longer plays a vital
role in politics and public attitudes today, rather it is other factors such as beliefs about
inequality, educational sophistication and political conservatism, among others, that motivate
people's policy preferences (e.g., Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986a, 1986b). In the other, debate
from advocates of racial explanations suggests that even though racism has decreased in the
past half-century, it still is very much prevalent in today's society and it is the major force
behind racial policy attitudes. In this camp, there is, however, a split between symbolic
racism theorists and old-fashioned racism theorists (see Chapter 2 for details on these two
forms of racism).
Those who argue for symbolic racism (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982;
McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears & Allen, 1984; Sears & Henry, 2005) propose that racism
has taken another form and changed from the blatant racism (old-fashioned racism) that
existed before to a new form of racism that is more subtle and covert (symbolic racism).
Therefore symbolic racism is said to be currently taking a dominant role in influencing racial
policy attitudes. On the other hand, other researchers (such as Kravitz, 1995; Kuklinski,
Sniderman, Knight, Piazza, Tetlock, Lawrence & Mellers, 1997; Sniderman and Tetlock,
1986a, 1986b;) argue that racism has not changed at all; rather symbolic racism is old-
fashioned racism by another name.
The present research study, mainly focussing on the role played by race prejudice, aims to
investigate whether or not - and to what extent - race prejudice is correlated with racial
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policy attitudes. Another dimension of interest that was also looked at was whether or not
racial attitudes were equally strong across different racial policy types. Given that a lot of
studies have already been done in this field, a meta-analytic study was more appropriate since
it allows for a more sophisticated quantitative, compared to the traditional qualitative, review
of available data, and it clearly indicates the strength of association between variables (Lipsey
& Wilson, 2001). Meta-analysis also allows for an integration of information from previous
studies, and this integration is hoped to help add new and valuable information to the
available literature in this field.
In the next chapter, I will present several lines of arguments from different researchers,





As noted in the last chapter, there has been an ongoing debate in recent studies as to whether
or not racism still is a motive in political life. Previous research shows that there has been a
decrease in racism in the past half century; suggesting that it is no longer a political problem.
However, some authors (such as Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982) debate whether
racism still exists and it is the main force behind racial policy attitudes. Yet others argue that
racial policy attitudes are motivated by other factors such as beliefs about the continuing
existence of racial discrimination, political conservatism, self- and group-interest (e.g., Bobo
& Kluegel, 1993; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986a, 1986b). Another line of argument of note
(e.g., Kravitz & Klineberg, 2004; Tuch & Hughes, 1996) centres on the role played by the
specific racial policies in question in influencing whites' attitudes toward them.
Hence, this chapter, in trying to shed light to the abovementioned debates, will review the
studies that deal with the different explanations given for the role played by both racial and
non-racial attitudes in influencing racial policy opinions. I will start by discussing the change
in whites' racial attitudes, and then go on to discuss whites' opposition to racial policies
despite the evidence of a decrease in racism (the principle-implementation gap) and the
different explanations given for contemporary racial policy attitudes. Finally, I will conclude
by stating what I aim to find in the present study.
7
2.2 The decrease in racial prejudice
Previous research suggests that racial prejudice has decreased since the Jim Crow system
where blacks were severely discriminated against to the present where they enjoy equal rights
with all other races. According to Sears (1998), the historical experience of African
Americans (in USA) can be divided into six different historical periods. The first one being
when blacks were forced into enslavement; followed by the second period where slavery was
abolished in the 1860s after the Civil War in America and because of the protests against
slavery. The third period is what is described as the Jim Crow system of racial supremacy
where blacks suffered as a result of a lot of racial discrimination and white supremacy was
declared.
The end of World War II marked the beginning of the fourth period, which showed "a surge
of progress in U.S race relations" and provoked change. This resulted in the passing of the
civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965 that officially ended racial discrimination. The fifth
period consisted of protests by black people demanding progress and equal treatment for
blacks in all areas of life. The fifth period then marked the beginning of the present period
(the sixth period) where courts ruled in favour of, for example, busing of school children in
order to promote school desegregation (Sears, 1998).
Looking through these six historical periods, it can be argued that a change in attitudes has
co-occurred with these historical changes. Previous research also supports this view. Take for
example, attitudes towards the principle of school integration; in review of over 50 years of
survey data, Schuman et al. (1997) found that there has been a great change in the public's
attitudes where they have shifted immensely from an overwhelming support for the principle
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of school segregation to an overwhelming acceptance of school integration. In the early
1940s, studies showed that whites were in great support of school segregation, whereas by
1985 more than nine out of ten white Americans showed that they were in favour of school
integration. Identical responses were also shown in attitudes towards the principles of equal
treatment in employment, public accommodations and in seating on public transportation
(Schuman et aI., 1997).
The present (sixth) period in history suggests that blacks are now being seen and treated as
equals. Consequently, one assumes a decrease in racial prejudice and therefore an increased
support for race-targeted policies aimed to compensate for past discrimination, promote
equality and create equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, Tuch and Hughes (1996, among
others) point out that even though there seems to be a decline in racial prejudice, it has not
completely disappeared and it might be one of the most important factors that influence racial
policy preferences by whites (See also Sniderman & Carmines, 1997).
2.3 The emergence of the principle-implementation gap
Schuman et al. (1997) argue that even though there has been a decrease in racism, there is no
simple answer as to how white racial policy attitudes have changed over the past half century.
They claim that the trends differ in terms of the kinds of questions asked. These trends, as
illustrated by Schuman et al. (1997) show that there is a huge worrying gap in terms of what
people say about the principles aimed at promoting equality and what they actually do when
it comes to supporting these principles; hence the "principle-implementation gap".
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Take for instance, the school integration principle mentioned above, in North America, in the
time period 1963 to 1986, studies showed that support for school integration rose by 30
percent, whereas support for implementation of the school integration principle (through
busing) by the federal government dropped by 9 percent (1964 - 1986), instead of increasing
as would be expected. Schuman et al. (1997) then concluded by saying that overall, though, it
seems as if "fewer people endorse the implementation of a principle than endorse the
principle itself... " (p.137, see also Durrheim & Dixon, 2005).
Another racial policy of interest that has raised a lot of concern and warrants mention is
affirmative action. Affirmative action programmes, in America, were introduced as positive
steps taken by the federal government to promote equality, instead of simply ending open
discrimination and legal segregation. The first step was to try and eradicate what is known as
'institutional racism' where, for example, jobs were only reserved for white applicants or
advertised in such a way that discouraged black applicants or in a way that only whites had
access to the information. The second step was to try and improve black people's lives by
making funds available to them especially in areas that were more poverty stricken. The third
and final step involved the preference given to blacks in employment and educational
situations. This was seen "as a way of both making up for past discrimination and
accelerating the move toward equality of outcomes" (Schuman et aI., 1997, p.1 01). However,
whereas individuals support the principle of equality of outcomes on the one hand, support
for specific affirmative action programmes put in place to achieve this goal is mixed at best
and very low in some cases (especially when programmes are perceived as giving preference
or special treatment to one group over another).
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As Pettigrew (2004) pointed out, although things have improved greatly in the past few
decades, there is still a long way to go before full equality can be achieved. There are a lot of
discrepancies as evidenced in the racial outcomes in society today, e.g., in housing,
employment, education, health, the justice system, economic status; the list is endless.
According to Tarman & Sears (2005) blacks are still experiencing disadvantages in almost
every domain of life. Sears (1998) also agrees with this viewpoint (see also Bobo, 1998) and
says that historically, it is blacks who have always occupied the bottom rung of the economic
ladder in jobs, income, educational level and housing, among other things, and this trend is
persistent in society today. Before the Civil War in America, blacks lived in dilapidated slave
quarters, were denied formal education and had no access to good jobs. At present, almost
two centuries later, such trends are still prevalent, with blacks living in run-down and crime-
ridden parts of the cities, receiving poor education and having access to low status jobs.
Therefore, "they are more at risk than any other group in almost every aspect one can think of
- for educational failure ... imprisonment ... racial discrimination, and police mistreatment"
(Sears, 1998, p. 79).
Presently, in USA, jails are full, especially, with young black males (the black imprisonment
rate is much higher than whites' rate of imprisonment), politicians run election campaigns on
racist platforms and more black citizens encounter voting problems than whites. On average,
blacks hold lower status jobs, compared to whites, and they receive lower income.
Unemployment is twice as high among the black population as it is among whites. Blacks are
by far the most residentially segregated of all American minorities and black Americans
comprise the larger portion of the homeless. Poverty is twice as high among blacks compared
to whites and proportionately more businesses are white owned. Blacks consistently receive
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poorer medical care than their white counterparts. Only 6% of African American marriages
involve a white partner (Pettigrew, 2004).
In terms of education, racial segregation of public education is on the increase (instead of
decreasing, as expected), with 70% of Black children attending predominantly-blacks schools
and 37% attending schools with 90% or more black students. Pettigrew (2004) explains that
this can be attributed to the fact that, although whites, are in support of school desegregation,
for example, they still fail to support busing, which was implemented as a way of eradicating
school segregation.
Overall, the above trends demonstrate that there is a problem that needs to be addressed,
where on the one hand whites seem to be in support of the principles proposed so as to do
away with discrimination; yet on the other hand, there is lack of support for actual
programmes implemented to promote equality (hence the much debated principle-
implementation gap, and, in turn, the continued disadvantages presently suffered by blacks).
However, there is much controversy as to the origins of this "principle-implementation" gap.
Although most researchers (e.g. Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kluege1 & Smith, 1983; Schuman et
aI., 1997) acknowledge that there has been a decrease in traditional prejudice; nevertheless,
there is still some debate as to what influences the low levels of support. Researchers have
advanced several explanations, both racial and non-racial, for the principle-implementation
gap, and the next section deals with these arguments in detail.
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2.4 Explanations of the principle-implementation gap
Presently, there is a raging debate going on amongst researchers as to why the principle-
implementation gap exists. Whilst some researchers agree that although racism has generally
diminished, it is still influential in politics today; others argue that it is no longer the driving
force behind racial policy attitudes, rather, other factors (non-racial or race-neutral) play a
vital role in motivating current racial policy attitudes. Researchers have attempted to explain
contemporary race-targeted policy attitudes through, for example, self-interest, continuing
negative racial attitudes and beliefs about inequality, political conservatism, stereotypes about
blacks, negative racial affect, symbolic racism and old-fashioned racism. In this section I will
start by giving a brief discussion of the non-racial explanations and then go on to discuss
arguments about the role of self-interest and specific racial policies involved. Finally, I will
discuss, in more detail, the racial explanations (race attitudes), which are the main focus of
this study.
2.4.1 Non-racial explanations
Advocates of non-racial explanations for racial policy attitudes maintain that there are other
race-neutral factors besides racism, such as beliefs about racial inequality, political
conservatism and educational sophistication, that account for whites' racial policy attitudes.
Although they acknowledge that racism is still prevalent and may play a part to some extent,
they argue that it does not play a central role anymore in motivating politics. In the following
subsections I will briefly discuss three lines of arguments from this viewpoint.
2.4.1.1 Beliefs about inequality
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Beliefs about inequality are concerned with "how cross-sections of white Americans interpret
continuing black-white differences in socio-economic levels" (Schuman et al., 1997, p.100).
In the past, traditional racists explained these differences as a result of biological differences,
with whites as the superior race, and blacks as innately inferior. On the other hand, those
whites that empathised with blacks recognised the need for racial equality in order to
compensate for past discrimination. Recently though, there has been a shift in beliefs about
innate differences and very few whites ever explain inequality in those terms anymore.
The mam explanation being gIven now focuses on the lack of motivation in blacks
themselves to improve their own situations - cultural differences (see Durrheim and Dixon,
2000). Schuman et al.'s (1997) findings indicate that overall, those whites who believe that
discrimination is no longer a problem tend to oppose any attempts made by the government
to improve blacks' socio-economic status; and the opposite is true for those who believe in
the continuing racial inequality.
According to Bobo and Kluegel (1993), when whites perceive racial discrimination as no
longer prevalent, they tend to oppose race-target policies intended to enhance blacks'
opportunities. In their 1993 study, Bobo and Kluegel found that beliefs about racial
discrimination are strongly correlated with race-targeted polices, giving credence to their
argument. They then conclude that perceived discrimination may be "theory driven" m
whites (used as a justification for group self-interest) and "experience driven" in blacks.
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Jacobson (1985) found that when whites perceive blacks as still being discriminated against,
they tend to have more positive attitudes towards affirmative action programmes. Tuch and
Hughes (1996) found that whites who do not believe that blacks are at a disadvantage
because of past discrimination are the ones who fail to support government sponsored
intervention policies. The main reason for this failure of support is that they believe that the
inequality is a result of black people's laziness and lack of ability. These findings led Tuch
and Hughes (1996) to conclude that education programmes are needed to inform whites about
the ongoing inconspicuous harm "of past and present discrimination" so they can understand
the need for racial policies in order to remedy this and promote equality (see also Stoker,
1996).
Kluegel and Smith (1983) also point out that support or opposition towards racial policies
may be dependent, to some extent, on how whites perceive blacks' opportunity. If blacks'
opportunity is perceived as equal to whites', then racial policies are highly likely to be
regarded as unnecessary, hence opposition. However, if blacks' opportunity is perceived as
less than average (with blacks at a disadvantage in opportunity relative to whites), racial
policies will be seen as necessary, and are supported as a result. They found that the general
denial of unequal opportunity also serves as a strong predictor of opposition to affirmative
action programmes. In other words, if whites believe that equal opportunity for blacks
already exists or if they do not believe that blacks are particularly burdened by the legacy of
past discrimination, they are highly likely to oppose government assistance programmes for
blacks (see also Tuch & Hughes, 1996).
2.4.1.2 Political conservatism
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Snidennan and Cannines (1997) argue that whites' opposition to government assistance
programmes for blacks can be explained by other factors such as political liberalism and
conservatism. Although supporters of the principled conservatism theory acknowledge that
racial prejudice may play a role, to some degree, in the opposition to racial policies, they
deny that it plays the central role (Kravitz & Klineberg, 2004; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher &
Tucker, 2006; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996; Snidennan & Piazza, 1993).
Kravitz and Klineberg (2004) suggest that the theory of conservatism is based on the
assumption that many people oppose affinnative action, for example, primarily because it is
contrary to conservative principles (such as hard work and self-reliance), not merely because
they are prejudiced (see also Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996; Snidennan & Piazza, 1993).
This line of argument also explains opposition to race-targeted policies as motivated by "a
conservative ideology that has little tolerance for policies that distribute opportunity
inequitably based on race or other group factors irrelevant to personal merit" (Reyna et al.,
2006, p. 4). Principled conservatism encourages a society that allows everyone to equally
(and individually) compete for jobs and other opportunities without additional help from
outside (from the government, for example). Hard work is supposed to be rewarded with
desirable outcomes and conversely, those who put in little effort (or are lazy) should also earn
very little. Accordingly, conservatives claim that any policies that favour one group over
another disturb this ideal system and are, therefore, fundamentally unfair (Reyna et al., 2006).
Not surprisingly, previous research shows that conservatives tend to oppose government
programmes to help blacks regardless of how positively or negatively they feel towards
16
blacks (Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman & Tetlock,
1986a, 1986b). Liberals, on the other hand, generally support racial equality enhancement
policies (Kravitz & Klineberg, 2004). These differences can be attributed to the fact that,
whereas liberals tend to favour a more active government role in eliminating racial
discrimination; conservatives argue that the government should prohibit racial discrimination,
but avoid any stronger action to increase racial equality (Kravitz & Klineberg, 2004; Reyna et
aI., 2006, Sears et al., 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Tuch & Hughes, 1996; Virtanen &
Huddy, 1998). Conservatives are also more likely to attribute blacks' negative life outcomes
to internal factors such as lack of effort, whereas liberals are more likely to attribute such
outcomes to external factors such as discrimination and lack of opportunity (Kravitz &
Klineberg, 2004; Reyna et al., 2006; Virtanen & Huddy, 1998).
2.4.1.3 Education or cognitive sophistication
In recent years, some debate has also arisen on the effects of education on race prejudice,
which, in turn, influences racial policy attitudes. Education is supposed to be an important
moderator for racial prejudice. Whilst a number of researchers argue that race prejudice has
decreased over the years, they have also argued that this is particularly the case among
educated whites (Lipset, 1960; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Steinberg & Selznick, 1969, as
cited in Federico & Sidanius, 2002). "More precisely, several researchers have argued that
education may attenuate the relationship between racial hostility and opposition to
affirmative action, as well as the relationship between racism and various race-neutral
predispositions" (Federico & Sidanius, 2002, p.147). The logic here is that since highly
educated individuals are more aware of and understand better abstract political concepts, their
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racial policy attitudes should be less coloured by racial prejudice; whereas the opposite is true
for the poorly educated individuals (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993).
However, some researchers have offered contrasting explanations; they have suggested that
"education may simply allow individuals to better align their racial policy preferences ...with
a desire to protect the dominant positions of the in-group" (Federico & Sidanius, 2002,
p.148). It is also argued that even though education is clearly connected to knowledge and
awareness, it may not in itself be a clear indication of a real understanding of politics (ibid.).
Federico and Sidanius (2002) found that racial policy attitudes and political ideology were
more powerfully associated with ideologies of racial dominance and superiority among
politically sophisticated (highly educated) white Americans than among politically
unsophisticated (poorly educated) white Americans (see also Sears, van Laar, Carrillo &
Kosterman, 1997). Moreover, political conservatism was found as strongly related to racism
among sophisticates, although the reverse would be expected. In addition, affirmative action
was negatively (instead of positively as would be expected) related to egalitarianism, and the
magnitude of this relationship actually increased with political sophistication. Both poorly
educated conservatives and poorly educated liberals tend to offer less support to race-targeted
policies promoting equal opportunity (Federico & Sidanius, 2002).
In their study, Bobo & Zubrinsky (1996) found that the lower the level of education in white
respondents, the higher the likelihood of opposing residential integration. Sidanius, Pratto and
Bobo (1996) found that as educational sophistication increases, so does the relationship
between classical racism (old-fashioned racism) and affirmative action opposition.
18
Tuch and Hughes (1996) found that respondents with higher education tend to support race-
targeted policies (specifically, compensatory programmes) more than less well-educated
respondents. However, education was reported to have a negative effect on support for
affirmative action programmes perceived as offering preferential treatment.
2.4.2 Self- and group-interest
In terms of self-interest as an explanation for the principle-implementation gap, two distinct
lines of arguments have recently emerged. One line of arguments pertains to the role of
individual or personal self-interest. Another underscores the importance of group or
collective self-interest. Kravitz and Klineberg (2004) explain that individual self-interest is
defined in terms of its short- to medium-term impact on an individual's own material well-
being. Bobo and Kluegel (1993) say that self-interest (in individual terms) can be narrowly
defined as "tangible losses or gains to an individual or his/her immediate family" (p. 445; see
also Kinder, 1986; Kluegel & Smith, 1983). On a broader group level, collective self-interest
refers to the impact of racial policies on the respondent's social group as a whole (Kravitz &
Klineberg, 2004), or a group-based assessment of self-interest influenced by membership or
identification with a certain group and a sense of shared fate (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993).
Kluegel and Smith (1983) also explain self-interest in economic terms. According to this
viewpoint, blacks and whites are constantly competing for jobs, promotion and other scarce
economic resources, which may explain why whites tend to oppose policies that potentially
pose a threat to their relatively privileged economic position (see also Tuch & Hughes, 1996).
Some scholars (such as Bobo, 1998; Bobo, Kluegel & Smith, 1997, as cited in Kravitz &
Klineberg, 2004; Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986a) claim that self-interest is not purely race-
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neutral. They argue that there is an underlying racial aspect to it and that an intercorrelation
between self-interest and racism exists. According to Blumer's (1958, as cited in Kravitz &
Klineberg, 2004) group position theory, when members of a racial group believe that they are
entitled to their dominant position and they feel that their position is threatened by the claims
of a subordinate group, they tend to develop racist ideologies so as to justify and maintain
their privileged status (see also Bobo, 1999). Therefore, whites' desire to maintain their in-
group interests and privileged position may influence opposition to race-targeted policies,
even if racism is generally less prevalent than in the past (Bobo, 1999).
The self-interest theory suggests that whites are unlikely to support policies from which they
do not benefit and that potentially impose costs on them, through, for example, taxation
(Bobo & Kluegel, 1993). However, from previous research, it appears that collective self-
interest is a much stronger predictor of racial policy attitudes than individual self-interest
(Kinder, 1986; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Kluegel & Smith, 1983; Sears, 1988; Tuch &
Hughes, 1996; Wood, 1994). Sniderman (as cited in Wood, 1994) reasons that this could be
attributed to the fact that people tend to relate to politics, not as individuals, but as group
members.
In their 1983 study, Kluegel and Smith examined the effects of economic self-interest, racial
affect and stratification beliefs on the attitudes held by whites toward affirmative action
programmes. Their findings showed that the strong determinants for current affirmative
action attitudes are racial affect and stratification beliefs rather than economic self-interest.
McConahay's (1982) findings also indicated that self-interest is not strongly correlated with
either opposition or support for busing, whereas race attitudes were strong predictors of
opposition to busing. However, Kravitz (1995) found that attitudes toward affirmative action
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were more strongly associated with self-interest than racism, contrary to previous findings
(i.e. Jacobson, 1985; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kluegel & Smith, 1983; McConahay, 1982).
2.4.3 Specific programmes involved
Researchers (e.g. Bobo, 1983; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Durrheim, 2003; Federico & Sidanius,
2002; Kluegel & Smith, 1983; Sears et a!., 1997; Sears & Henry, 2003) generally agree with
the previously mentioned opinion that even though nearly all whites are in favour of the
principle of equal opportunity in terms of jobs and education, for example, support for
programmes (or racial policies) implemented in order to ensure this equality of opportunity
have not received strong support. Racial policies (also known as race-targeted policies) are
those policies (such as affirmative action) that are targeted at remedying the effects of past
racial discrimination so as to promote equality. The general argument is that race-targeted
policies are more likely to be opposed than "universal-income-targeted policies" (policies
that benefit everyone) (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Tuch & Hughes,
1996). For the purposes of the present study, four categories of racial policies were identified,




Compensatory programmes, which involve, for example, spending money on
early education programmes in predominantly black areas or awarding college
scholarships to black students (Krysan, 2000; Tuch & Hughes, 1996);
Preferential treatment programmes, which involve, for example, racial quotas in
college admissions, job hiring and promotion (Tuch & Hughes, 1996);
General racial policies - fall in between the above two extremes (Kluegel &
Smith, 1983). They include, for example, "government assistance to blacks"
(Sears & Henry, 2003; Sears et a!., 1997), and sometimes, in some studies, they
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are not clearly defined (as they have been recently criticised by Tuch & Hughes
(1996), for example - see below) or are just lumped together, e.g., as "affirmative
action programmes" or "equal opportunity policies", which makes it difficult to
properly categorise them; and
• Desegregation programmes, involve policies such as busing (for school
integration) and fair housing laws (for residential integration).
Tuch and Hughes (1996) argued that previous research has failed to examine specific racial
policies, focussing instead on general and usually vague questions about racial policies, with
respondents often asked about unspecified "government intervention" to aid minorities. They
explain further that if a survey question poses a concrete and specified government action to
remedy a specific problem, it is highly likely to elicit a very different response than a survey
question that is context free. In other words, whites' support for racial policies is not
monolithic; it can vary significantly depending on the specific policy in question (see also
Bobo, 1998; Stoker, 1996).
Kravitz and Klineberg (2004), focussing on affirmative action programmes specifically, agree
with Tuch and Hughes's (1996) argument by saying that the descriptions given for
affirmative action in research are usually very general, simplistic and potentially misleading.
Respondents are often asked to evaluate their attitudes towards "affirmative action" without
any descriptions or definitions given to explain what "affirmative action" is. Since
individuals understand affirmative action in many different ways, it makes it very difficult to
know what respondents actually believe they are evaluating in a study.
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Previous research tends to focus on the distinction between preferential treatment and
compensatory programmes. On the one hand, programmes that are perceived as promoting
preferential treatment are reported as strongly opposed by approximately 90 percent of the
whites. "On the other hand, programs to simply help blacks win jobs or gain access to higher
education (compensatory programmes) have a much higher level of support - by roughly 70
percent of the white public" (Kluegel & Smith, 1983, pp. 797-8). In their survey, Schuman et
al. (1997) also found that with regards to specific affirmative action programmes
implemented, more support has been given for compensatory programmes with very little
support for preferential treatment programmes (see also Tuch & Hughes, 1996). Those
programmes that fall in between the two extremes (general racial policies) tend to receive
intermediate levels of support (Kluegel & Smith, 1983).
Desegregation policies such as busing, whilst they are supported in principle, have received
very low levels of support in practice (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; McConahay 1982; Schuman et
aI., 1997). In fact, as Pettigrew (2004) argued (see section 2.3 above for a full account),
despite the busing policy implemented to promote school integration, school segregation is
on the increase in American society. In McConahay's 1982 study, racial attitudes were strong
predictors of busing attitudes; the more racially prejudiced the more opposed (see also Giles,
Gatlin & Cataldo, 1976). Even the white residents in Louisville (where the study was done)
who did not have children affected were opposed to busing. McConahay then concluded that
because it is no longer fashionable to express one's negative feelings towards blacks openly,
these feelings are then displaced onto busing, with busing taken as a symbol that represents
what is perceived by whites as blacks' unfair gains in status and economics, hence the
opposition. In that sense, one can justify their opposition not as a result of racism, but as a
result of their sense ofjustice being violated.
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Residential desegregation has also received much support in principle, but residential
segregation still persists, especially in metropolitan areas (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996; Krysan,
2000; Massey & Denton, 1993). Pettigrew (2004) reported that African Americans are
actually the most segregated group in America. Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) argued that this
could mainly be attributed to stereotypes that different racial groups hold about others (or
out-groups). If whites, for example, believe that blacks are very noisy and have a tendency to
disrupt neighbourhood peace, then they are highly unlikely to be supportive of policies that
allow such individuals to move to their neighbourhoods.
Tuch and Hughes (1996) stated that compensatory programmes tend to receive more support
than preferential treatment programmes, which are rejected by almost all whites. Lack of
support for preferential treatment programmes, according to Tuch and Hughes (1996), could
be attributed to whites' perception of such programmes as encouraging inequality where
white people themselves are at a disadvantage (see also Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). To
illustrate this point, take for example, a case where a white person is denied a promotion at
work in favour of a less qualified black individual (Tuch & Hughes, 1996).
Tuch and Hughes (1996) pointed out that preferential treatment policies may be opposed
because they are perceived as violating the principle of fairness. Other researchers (such as
Krysan, 2000; Nosworthy, Lea & Lindsay, 1995; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman
& Piazza, 1993) concur that whites' opposition to polices such as affirmative action is not a
result of a dislike for blacks or a desire to maintain their group's privileged position; rather, it
is a result of their sincere belief that such policies promote preferential treatment with a
certain (targeted) group benefiting over another (or others). According to Kravitz (1995),
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people are more likely to support racial policies that they consider to be fair than those they
believe to be unfair. Whilst the eradication of discrimination may be perceived as fair,
preferential treatment as a means to achieve the equality goal would be construed as most
unfair.
Kravitz and Klineberg (2004) say that it is important that research investigate respondents'
reactions to the specific affirmative action programmes in question, specifically, and racial
policies in general. They claim that affirmative action programmes range from the
elimination of discrimination (equal treatment), through to opportunity enhancement, to
preferences (equal outcomes). Individuals, according to this line of argument, supposedly
oppose racial policies only when they can rationally explain their actions in non-racial terms.
In other words, since it is very difficult to justify opposition to weak affirmative action
programmes such as equal treatment plans, even prejudiced individuals will express support
for such policies. Alternatively, even non-prejudiced individuals are likely to oppose strong
preferential treatment programmes, because such programmes seriously violate widely held
justice norms. With regards to policies with intermediate strength (opportunity enhancement
policies), prejudiced individuals are highly likely to oppose them, whereas non-prejudiced
individuals are likely to support them since they primarily enhance a target group's
opportunities without harming the non-target groups' (ibid.).
2.4.4 Racial Explanations
Generally, racial explanations posit that there is ongoing prejudice, which explains opposition
to race-targeted policies. New theories of racism, however, distinguish between modem
(symbolic) and old-fashioned racism. The general consensus from both sides is that although
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racism has decreased over the last few decades, it has not completely disappeared. The
leading argument from symbolic racism theorists, however, is that although racism is still
prevalent, it has taken another form.
McConahay stated, "old-fashioned racism involves the expression of coarse and blatant racist
beliefs" (as cited in Durrheim 2003, p. 243). Such racist beliefs include beliefs of biological
inferiority of blacks and open support for segregation and discrimination (ibid.). Modem
racism, on the other hand, involves subtle, disguised and indirect expressions of racial
prejudice. Symbolic and old-fashioned racism are therefore the main variables of interest in
this study. Other important variables related to old-fashioned and symbolic racism that are
going to be discussed in the following subsections are racial affect and stereotypes, since they
are also racial explanations given for lack of support for race-targeted policies that will be
examined in the present study.
2.4.2.1 Symbolic racism
Sears and Kinder (1970/1971) initially introduced the concept of symbolic racism in an
attempt to explain the findings of a survey conducted on Los Angeles mayoralty elections
where a liberal black candidate (Tom Bradley) was running for mayor against a conservative
white candidate (Sam Yorty) (as cited in Sears, 1988). According to Sears (1988), Thomas
Pettigrew and colleagues developed and conducted the original survey trying to analyse
whites' reactions towards black mayoral candidates; thus, "the concept of symbolic racism
was, therefore, originally generated inductively to describe the results from items that had
been developed by other researchers for other purposes; the items were not generated
deductively to measure a preexisting concept" (p. 56). However, the measurement of
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symbolic racism has since evolved over the years, with other items added or changed so as to
measure the concept more precisely (Sears, 1988; Tarman & Sears, 2005).
At this point in time, the symbolic racism theory and its measurement, according to Sears and
Henry (2005) and Tarman and Sears (2005), encompasses four specific themes: Beliefs that:
• Blacks no longer face much prejudice or discrimination;
• Blacks' failure to progress results from their unwillingness to work hard enough;
• Blacks are demanding too much too fast; and
• Blacks have gotten more than they deserve.
Symbolic racism theorists (e.g. Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; McConahay &
Hough, 1976; Sears, 1998; Sears & Allen, 1984; Sears & Henry, 2005; Sears, Hensler &
Speer, 1979) have set forth the chief argument that it is indeed symbolic racism that plays a
central role in shaping people's attitudes towards racial policies. They suggest that racism has
not completely disappeared; rather, it has only been transformed from its traditional form to a
new form of racism that they have dubbed 'symbolic racism'. Symbolic racism, they claim, is
much more common, and it is a significantly stronger predictor of attitudes towards racial
policies and black political candidates today than traditional racism, racial stereotypes and
anti-black affect (McConahay, 1982; Sears, 1998/1988; Sears et aI., 1997).
It is explained that symbolic racism measurements correlate more strongly with racial policy
attitudes, compared to traditional racism measurement, because the items in the symbolic
racism scales are less blatantly racist in content. In terms of racial affect, symbolic racism is
argued to have a stronger effect since it is a combination of racial affect and traditional
values, therefore that blend is expected to have a stronger correlation than racial affect alone.
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Since stereotypes tend to be very negative and strongly associated with old-fashioned racism,
according to symbolic racists, it makes sense that they would have less effect on racial policy
attitudes than the new form of racism (McConahay, 1982; Sears, 1998/1988; Sears et al.,
1997).
This new form of racism "is based on moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional ...
values as individualism, the work ethic, obedience and discipline" (Kinder & Sears, 1981,
p.416 (see also Little, Murry & Wimbush, 1998; Sears & Henry, 2003; Sears et aI., 1997)). It
is believed that this dislike of blacks is acquired in childhood and it endures through
adulthood (Kinder & Sears, 1971, in Durrheim, 2003; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988;
Sears & Henry, 2005; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986a). McConahay and Hough (1976) also say
that symbolic racism involves "the expression in terms of abstract ideological symbols and
symbolic behaviours of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished values and making
illegitimate demands on the racial status quo" (p.38). According to Sears (1998), symbolic
racism involves "a blend of antagonism to blacks with attachment to traditional American
values that have nothing to do with race (such as work ethic, traditional morality and respect
for traditional authority)" (p. 83). Therefore, symbolic racism is alleged to be a combination
of racial prejudice and traditional values. It is phrased in abstract and ideological terms,
"reflecting the white person's moral code and how society should be organised rather than
having any direct bearing on the person's private life" (Sears, 1998, p. 83). Symbolic racism
is also directed towards blacks as a group rather than specific individuals.
Sears and AlIen (1984) stated that symbolic racists tend to deny the continuing existence of
discrimination against blacks. Whites resent race targeted policies because they view them as
"reverse discrimination", where blacks are favoured by getting special treatment through, for
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example, racial quotas in jobs or education, getting excessive access to welfare and getting
unfair economic gains. They are also antagonistic toward blacks because they believe that
blacks are "pushing too hard" and "moving too fast" (McConahay, 1982; Sears & AlIen,
1984; Sears & Henry, 2003; Sears et aI., 1997). It is argued that since it is no longer
fashionable to express one's racially prejudiced opinions in public, such attitudes (mentioned
above) are more acceptable ways of expressing underlying prejudice simply because they
rationalise opinions in race-neutral terms. In other words, many whites will discriminate
against blacks if the situation allows them to attribute their racially tinged behaviour and
beliefs to non-racial causes (Kravitz & Klineberg, 2004; McConahay, 1982; Reyna et al.,
2006).
Sears and Henry (2005) claim "the effects of symbolic racism are almost identical across a
wide variety of racial policies" (p. 141). In other words, they dispute the proposition (made
by Kravitz & Klineberg, 2004; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Tuch & Hughes, 1996; for
example) that opposition to policies maybe a result of the perceived "fairness" of the specific
racial policy in question. According to Sears and Henry (2005), currently no evidence exists
to substantiate such a claim.
Sears and AlIen (1984) report that symbolic racism has a much stronger influence than self-
interest in opposition to busing. Kinder and Sears (1981) also found symbolic racism to be a
strong determinant of opposition to busing and voting behaviours. They also observed that it
is not only the parents of children threatened with busing who are against it, therefore
precluding the self-interest theory.
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In their study, Sears et al. (1997) found symbolic racism to be a strong predictor of whites'
racial policy preferences. Jacobson (1985) found both the new and old-fashioned racism, as
well as self-interest, to be significant correlates of affirmative action attitudes, with the new
racism correlating stronger than others (which was consistent with McConahay's (1982) and
Little, Murry & Wimbush's (1998) results).
As can be expected of such an elaborate claim, the new racism theory has been a subject of
considerable debate among researchers on both theoretical and methodological grounds, and
has stimulated a lot of research in the past couple of decades. It has been widely criticised by
other scholars (e.g., Bobo, 1983; Jacobson, 1985; Kravitz, 1995; Sniderman & Tetlock,
1986a, 1986b; Virtanen & Huddy, 1998) on several grounds. Its critics question, for example,
the conceptualisation of symbolic racism, the validity of its measurement scale(s) and its
separateness from the old-fashioned racism.
Bobo and Kluegel (1993) and Kravitz (1995), for example, question the validity of
classifying any items measuring attitudes toward racial policies (e.g., affirmative action
attitudes or busing attitudes) as a measure of racism. In other words, they argue that the
strong effects of symbolic racism on racial policy attitudes can be explained by the fact that
the symbolic racism scale items are too close in content to the dependent variables (or policy
preference measures) that they claim to predict (see also Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986a). Bobo
and Kluegel (1993) criticise authors such as Kinder and Sears (1981) for using "anti-
affirmative action attitudes and anti-economic assistance to blacks as direct indicators of
racism" (p. 460). Kravitz (1995) concurs and says that in the end, it seems meaningless to say
that opposition to affirmative action is a result of symbolic racism when you are actually
using affirmative action attitudes items to indicate symbolic racism itself. Sniderman and
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Tetlock (1986b) then accused Sears and colleagues of "leeching away" the meaning of racism
and diminishing it "by making it merely a synonym for political attitudes with which one
happens to disagree" (p. 186).
In response to the above critique, Tarman and Sears (2005) acknowledged that, indeed, in the
past, a few of the items used to measure symbolic racism might have tapped a bit into racial
policy preferences as pointed out by the symbolic racism critics. Nevertheless, they argued
that these few items do not embody enough basis for the dismissal of the entire symbolic
racism theory altogether. To illustrate their point, Tarman and Sears (2005) decided to purge
the symbolic racism scale of the disputed items and re-test the effect of symbolic racism on
racial policy attitudes. Their findings showed that even when the symbolic racism scale is
purged of the few questionable items, it hardly changes and still remains strong and
significantly correlated with racial policy attitudes (also see Sears & Henry, 2005).
The next subsection will discuss in more detail some of the criticisms and questions raised
about symbolic racism in relation to old-fashioned racism.
2.4.2.2 Old-fashioned racism
According to McConahay (1982) old-fashioned racism involves "the overt expression of
negative feelings toward blacks in negative beliefs and open acts of discrimination and
expression" (p. 705). Such racist beliefs include beliefs in biological inferiority of blacks and
open support for segregation and discrimination (Durrheim, 2003). Old-fashioned racism is
crude in nature, as opposed to the subtlety of symbolic racism.
31
Critics of the symbolic racism theory (e.g., Bobo, 1983; Jacobson, 1985; Sniderman &
Tetlock, 1986a, 1986b) argue that the new form of racism (symbolic racism) may not be new
at all, but the old form of racism by another name. As Sniderman and Tetlock (1986a) put it,
" in so far as it is racism, far from being new, it is very old indeed" (p. 148). In that sense,
they argue that opposition to race-targeted policies may still be influenced by old-fashioned
racism rather than symbolic racism. According to Sniderman and Tetlock (1986a, 1986b),
symbolic racism theorists have failed to distinguish convincingly between old-fashioned
racism and symbolic racism.
Sniderman and Tetlock (1986a) further argue that the calculated correlations between
measures of these two forms of racism (e.g. McConahay (1982) reported a correlation of .58;
McClendon (1985) reported .65; Jacobson (1985) reported a .49 correlation), even though
they seem to show that old-fashioned and symbolic racism are not "the same thing", still give
a "clear warning that the two have much in common and that, in consequence, it may be
difficult to distinguish them empirically" (p.136, see also Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986b).
Moreover, they claim, there is no clear distinction of the causes of both forms of racism: it
seems as if what causes symbolic racism is the same as what causes old-fashioned racism.
Therefore, how can we say these are two entirely different forms of racism? Jacobson (1985)
adds that all symbolic racism theorists seem to have done is exclude a few items from the
old-fashioned racism scale when constructing the symbolic racism scale, but are basically
still measuring the same thing as old-fashioned racism.
Thus researchers such as Sniderman & Tetlock (1986a, 1986b) dispute the validity of the
symbolic racism claim and argue that whites' political opinions are still being influenced by
old-fashioned racism. Supporters of the old-fashioned racism theory agree that, indeed,
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racism has not completely disappeared but disagree with Sears and colleagues' proposition of
a new from of racism. Rather, they argue, that it is old-fashioned racism, albeit supported by
a minority of the white population, which still underlies whites' present-day racial policy
attitudes.
2.4.2.3 Racial Affect
According to Sears (1998, 1988), racial affect (sometimes called anti-black affect) underlies
both old-fashioned and symbolic racism; both kinds of racism "share a common roots in
antagonism toward blacks" (Sears, 1998, p. 83). Anti-black affect is apparently acquired in
pre-adult life and "it maybe experienced subjectively as a fear, avoidance and a desire for
distance, anger, distaste, disgust, contempt, apprehension, unease, or simple dislike" (Sears,
1988, p. 70). Racial affect is commonly measured by using the feeling thermometer
(McConahay, 1982; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996; Tuch & Hughes, 1996). The feeling
thermometer is a scale that runs from 0 degrees, which represents extremely cold feelings, to
100 degrees, which represents extremely warm feelings, with 50 degrees representing neutral
feelings (Bobo & Zubrinsky, 1996; McConahay, 1982).
Nosworthy, Lea and Lindsay (1995) however, argue that some people might oppose some
programmes, not because of any negative attitudes toward the group that is benefiting, but
because they view the procedure that is followed in the implementation as unfair. Therefore,
their opposition is influenced merely by their sense of justice rather than racial affect. As a
result, Nosworthy, Lea and Lindsay (1995) suggest that maybe we should examine racial
affect and justice values separately. "This strategy might reveal the degree to which measures
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of symbolic racism are tapping generic justice concerns, rather than a new form of racism"
(Nosworthy, Lea & Lindsay, 1995, p. 316).
Following Nosworthy, Lea and Lindsay's (1995) argument, racial affect is expected to be a
weaker predictor of policy attitudes than symbolic racism (which includes the justice/values
component).
2.4.2.4 Stereotypes
People stereotype others by accepting and readily endorsing negative or positive
characterisations of a certain group without a factual basis. "The more frequently and
consistently a person endorses negative characterisations of blacks the more racially
prejudiced that person is" (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993, p. 89). Such stereotypes include
beliefs that blacks would be far better off if they worked harder (that is, they are lazy), blacks
take advantage of welfare, they are violent, irresponsible, less intelligent than whites,
unfriendly and they are born with less ability than whites (Bobo & Kluegel, 1983; Sniderman
& Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sears et aI., 1997; Tuch & Hughes, 1996). As
whites' dislike of blacks increases, so does their opposition to, for example, government
programmes that help blacks get jobs (Sniderman & Carrnines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza,
1993).
Stereotypes, according to Jost & Banaji (1994), can be used to justify the subordinate status
of certain groups in society, and inversely, the dominant status of others (as cited in Reyna et
aI., 2006). Take for example, the stereotypes that blacks are lazy and less capable, they justify
why blacks hold a low status and conversely, the stereotype that whites are very hardworking
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helps to justify their dominant position. Therefore, whites can legitimise their opposition to
race-targeted policies by saying that blacks do not deserve any government assistance
because they do not put forth any effort to help themselves.
Prior research indicates that negative stereotypes toward an out-group have a major influence
on resistance to residential integration (Bobo & Zubrinsky, 1996). In their study, Bobo and
Zubrinsky examined the relationship between stereotypes (on the dimensions of intelligence,
welfare dependency and difficulty to get along with socially) and racial residential
integration, and found that opposition to residential integration tends to increase as
stereotypes become more negative, especially among white respondents, though blacks,
Hispanics and Asians seem to follow the same trend as well.
However, Sniderman and Piazza (1993) hold the view that sometimes those white people
who hold the belief that blacks could be better off if they worked harder are not necessarily
prejudiced. Indeed, they acknowledge some of the disadvantages suffered by blacks because
of past discrimination, but they still believe that if blacks took some of the responsibility and
work hard towards making their situation better, then they would be better off, or would be in
better positions. In other words, they (whites) think that blacks should also make an effort in
order to make things better for themselves. Sniderman and Piazza (1993) conclude by saying
that "affirmative action is so intensely disliked that it has led some whites to dislike blacks -
an ironic example of a policy meant to put the divide of race behind us in fact further
widening it" (p. 109).
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2.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, one might ask: Does racism have an effect on racial policy attitudes? Does it
matter how racism is measured? Does racism effect differ on different racial policies? After
going through the literature, it appears that even though racial prejudice has decreased, it has
not completely disappeared. It seems to still be a major force behind the formation of racial
policy attitudes. Sniderman and Piazza (1993) argued that the more whites dislike blacks the
more likely they are to oppose racial policies. Previous research (e.g. Kluegel & Smith, 1983)
has also shown that racially prejudiced whites are highly likely to oppose race-targeted
policies; and despite criticisms against the conceptualisation and the measurement of
symbolic racism, a growing body of evidence seems to suggest that it maybe the main driving
force behind the resistance to race-targeted policies rather than old-fashioned racism.
As already noted above, there is an ongoing debate as to the validity of the scales used to
measure symbolic racism, old-fashioned racism, racial affect and stereotypes, mainly because
of the intercorrelations among these predictor variables. Some researchers, (e.g. Jacobson,
1985; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986a, 1986b), argue that the scales used (e.g., to measure old-
fashioned and symbolic racism) are basically the same measures with only a few items left
out of one scale or added into the other, in an attempt to make a distinction between the two.
Yet McConahay, Sears and colleagues still maintain that these concepts are not the same at
all; they maybe related to a certain extent, but are still different. Therefore according to this
line of argument, there is sufficient justification for separating them into different
measurement scales. McConahay (1982) maintains that the old-fashioned racism scale, racial
affect measure and modem racism scale are conceptually distinct and therefore should be
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treated as separate measures. Sears and Henry (2005) concur and say that old-fashioned
racism and symbolic racism measures are two distinct scales and, thus, should be treated as
such. In fact, according to David O. Sears (personal communication, October 19, 2005), "it is
important to distinguish between different forms of prejudice, because symbolic racism has
so much stronger effects than traditional or old-fashioned prejudice".
In the present study, on a broader level, I am mainly concerned with finding out:
• Whether or not racial prejudice is actually correlated with people's racial policy
attitudes; and
• To what extent racial prejudice shapes up people's racial policy attitudes.
If there is a decrease in racial prejudice and the shift in attitudes is genuine, as previous
studies seem to suggest, then what is the force behind racial policy attitudes in the present
day? What is influencing the much talked about "principle-implementation gap"? What are
its origins? These are some of the questions most researchers are faced with today and are
battling to get answers to. Despite much research done in this area so far, there does not seem
to be a consensus among all researchers as to what causes this gap. Therefore, with this meta-
analytic study, combining several research fmdings from previous studies, I hope to shed
light to some of these concerns.
Here are the main questions I am attempting to answer with the present meta-analysis:
• Is racism a strong predictor of racial policy attitudes?
• Does symbolic racism hold the strongest influence on racial policy attitudes,
compared to old-fashioned racism, racial affect and stereotypes?
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• Overall, are all four predictor variables, i.e., old-fashioned and symbolic racism,
racial affect and stereotypes strong predictors of racial policy attitudes?
• Are the effects of race attitudes equally strong across different racial policy
types?
• Does racism have a stronger effect on preferential treatment policies compared to




3.1 What is meta-analysis?
Several authors have advanced various definitions of 'meta-analysis'. According to Glass
(1976), meta-analysis refers to the "analysis of analyses". In other words, meta-analysis is
"the statistical analysis of a large collection of analysis results from individual studies for the
purpose of integrating the findings" (Glass, 1976, p. 3). Glass (1976) also states that meta-
analysis provides a more thorough alternative to the traditional narrative discussions or
attempts to make sense of the rapidly expanding research literature. Hunter and Schmidt
(1982, p. 137, as cited in Tredoux, 2002, p. 404) defined meta-analysis as " ... the quantitative
accumulation and analysis of descriptive statistics across studies."
Lipsey and Wilson (2001) further explain that meta-analysis can be understood as a form of
research that surveys research reports rather than people. The meta-analyst develops a coding
form (survey protocol), gathers a sample or population of research reports and then goes on to
"interview" each study by reading it carefully and coding the appropriate information about
its characteristics and quantitative findings. The resulting data are then analysed.
Finally, according to Rosenthal (1995), "Meta-analytic reviews are quantitative summaries of
research domains that describe the typical strength of the effect or phenomenon, its
variability, it's statistical significance and the nature of the moderator variables from which
one can predict the relative strength ofthe effect of phenomenon" (p. 183).
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3.2 When and how to use meta-analysis
Meta-analysis only applies to empirical research studies and it only applies to studies using
quantitative measures of variables and reporting descriptive or inferential statistics to
summarise resulting data. In other words, only research studies that produce quantitative
findings can be used to do a meta-analysis (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Tredoux, 2002).
When doing a meta-analysis, Lipsey and Wilson (2001; see also Rudner, Glass, Evartt &
Emery, 2002; Tredoux, 2002) stated that one should start by clearly defining their domain of
interest. When a topic is clearly defined, it makes it easier to know what is important and
what is not; hence, which studies are relevant for the meta-analysis and which ones are not. It
is also important to give rationale for the inclusion or exclusion of studies from the meta-
analysis. The meta-analyst should include only those studies closely related to his/her topic
and those that have the data, or at least have most of the data needed for analysis. If there are
missing data, then one should ensure that the inclusion of such a study (or studies) will not
negatively impact on the final results (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
3.3 The use of effect sizes
Since meta-analysis represents each study's findings in the form of effect sizes, it is
important to define an effect size statistic that effectively captures/represents the quantitative
findings of a set of research studies in a standardised form that allows for meaningful
numerical comparison and analysis across studies (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, p. 5).
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Pearson's r, among others, is considered to be an appropriate effect size statistic for meta-
analysis in its raw form since it is a standardised statistic (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001; Tredoux, 2002). However, according to Lipsey and Wilson (2001), when using
correlation (r) as your meta-analysis effect size, there are problems in the sense that in its
standardized form, the product-moment correlation coefficient has some very undesirable
statistical properties, including a problematic standard error formulation. The standard error
is used to determine the inverse variance weight needed for analysis. Thus, correlations, when
used as effect sizes, are usually transformed using Fisher's Zr-transformation.
Hunter and Schmidt (1990) though, argue that it is not always necessary to transform the r
statistic to Fisher Zr. Even though some authors argue that the averaged r gives a somewhat
less accurate average (causes a negative bias), Hunter and Schmidt (1990) reported that the
transformed z correlation actually produces an upward bias (because it gives larger weights to
large correlations than to small ones). This bias is especially large if there is variation in the
population correlations across studies. They then concluded: "meta-analysis is never made
more accurate by using the Fisher z transformation (though in practice it usually doesn't
make much difference in the final outcome of the meta-analysis)" (p. 102). Hence, in the end
it is simply the individual meta-analyst's prerogative to choose whichever method they
prefer. For the purposes of the present study, however, it was decided to calculate/analyse
both transformed Fisher z correlations and untransformed r correlations for comparison
purposes.
Sampling error is smaller for effect sizes estimated from large sample sizes than those
estimated from small samples. To prevent effect sizes from small samples from carrying as
much weight as effect sizes from large samples, each effect size must be weighted by its
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corresponding sample size when calculating the mean and variance statistics across studies
(Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Tredoux, 2002).
3.4 Advantages of meta-analysis
There are a number of reasons why it is more advantageous to use meta-analysis rather than
the traditional review methods. Firstly, one of the main reasons why it is so rewarding to use
meta-analysis, according to Lipsey and Wilson (2001), is that the research summarising
process is made explicit (by explaining each step taken from the beginning to the end) and
systematic - which enables the reader to assess the author's assumptions, procedures,
evidence and conclusions rather than take on faith that the conclusions are valid.
Secondly, key findings are represented in a way that is more differentiated and sophisticated
than conventional review procedures that rely on qualitative summaries or "vote counting" on
statistical significance. In other words, because the magnitude and direction of each relevant
statistical relationship in a population of studies is encoded, meta-analysis is sensitive to
findings of different strengths across studies (Glass, 1976; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Tredoux,
2002).
Thirdly, meta-analysis allows for the detailed examination of the differences between studies
and associated differences in their findings that one cannot find in qualitative narrative
summaries (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Rudner et al., 2002). Finally, meta-analysis provides an
organised way of handling information from a large number of study findings under review.
In other words, with sophisticated software available today, it is possible to code a large
amount of information from each study without fear of getting it all mixed up and becoming
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too confused (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Rudner et aI., 2002). However, Lipsey and Wilson
(2001) also point out that meta-analysis does not necessarily require a large number of
studies. In some cases, it is possible to meta-analyse as few as two or three study findings
(see also Rosenthal, 1995).
3.5 Disadvantages of using meta-analysis
As with any other method of analysis, meta-analysis is not without its own flaws and critics.






It requires too much time and effort.
It requires expertise - to be able to do the proper selection and computation of
appropriate effect sizes and the application of statistical analysis to them.
Some studies have subtle and complex elements that might need qualitative
summaries instead of meta-analysis. However, it is possible to do both on the
same body of findings and then draw an overall conclusion from both.
The file drawer problem - that is, the problem of a possible upward bias in meta-
analysis findings as a result of using only published results for analysis. However,
the meta-analyst can control for this by contacting the individual researchers
known to work in the same field dealing with same topic to see if they have or
know of other studies, both published and unpublished, that can be added to the
database (which means the meta-analyst has to provide the researchers with a
complete list ofthe studies they already have).
A mixture of studies is included (the issue of apples and oranges - including
studies of distinctly different topics or from different research designs in the same
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meta-analysis) can result in summary statistics being less meaningful.
Nevertheless, this problem could be countered in two ways:
< By keeping methodological criteria strict and accepting consequences in
regard to the limitation thus imposed on the proportion of available relevant
studies that may be included - could have little generality.
< By carefully coding methodological characteristics that may influence the
study findings and treating them as moderator variables.
3.6 Why meta-analysis was chosen for the present study
Meta-analysis can be a very useful tool when dealing with topics that have a lot of empirical
findings; it helps integrate findings. Researchers seldom attempt to replicate previous
findings; they tend to pursue new studies with new methods or try to add on to whatever is
the 'current' state of knowledge in their field. This can result in an overwhelming number of
studies on the same topic with results often contradicting each other and no particular study
similar to another one. A similar case is found in the topic chosen for the current study.
Therefore, instead of going out to the field to try and find more evidence to support or dispute
theories being put forward by current researchers, basically addition on to the confusion, a
meta-analytic study was decided upon.
3.7 Sample
A population of studies reporting the correlation between racial prejudice and racial policy
attitudes quantitatively was collected. 28 studies were used to do this meta-analysis. From the
Twenty-eight studies, 216 correlation effect sizes were initially yielded for analysis
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(Appendix 1 contains a complete list of the studies used in this meta-analysis). Two of the 28
studies were published in the 1970s (specifically 1976 and 1978), 7 were published in the
1980s, lOin the 1990s, 8 from 2000 to the present and one was an unpublished study (Reyna
et aI., 2006). 3 of the studies (i.e. Sears & AlIen, 1984; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997;
Sniderman & Piazza, 1993) were published in textbooks and the other 24 were Journal
articles. The sample sizes in each study ranged between n = 44 and n = 2 705 subjects. The
total (grand) sample size consisted ofN = 187 191 participants, with a mean ofNM = 867 and
a median of NMd = 698. Almost all the studies had white respondents. Correlation values
ranged from -0.25 to +0.62, with a raw (or unweighted) correlation mean of 0.2149. Of the
216 correlations retrieved, 13 were negative and the other 203 were positive (with high
correlations representing high opposition to racial policies).
A database with all the study information was kept in a Microsoft Excel file for easy access
and management of data. A file with all the ordered articles that I was still waiting for was
also kept in order to be able to keep track of what was still needed and what I already had. All






Name of Journal published in.
Year of publication.
Racial attitude type:
< Symbolic racism - as explained in chapter 2.
< Old-fashioned racism - as explained in chapter 2.
< Racial affect - as explained in chapter 2.
< Stereotypes - as explained in chapter 2.
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• Racial attitude - explanations, or the scale used to measure the racial attitude, for
example:
< For symbolic racism, some authors used, e.g.,
The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale which includes items such as: "It's
really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks
would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites"; "Irish,
Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same"; and "Some say that
black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they
haven't pushed fast enough. What do you think?" (see Sears & Henry,
2005).
~ McConahay's 1982 symbolic racism scale using items such as "Over
the past few years the government and news media have shown more
respect to blacks than they deserve"; "Over the past few years blacks
have gotten more economically than they deserve"; and "Blacks are
getting too demanding in their push for equal rights" (McConahay,
1982; Kinder, 1986).
~ Kinder and Sears' 1971 symbolic racism scale containing items such
as: "Could most Negroes who receive welfare get along without it, or
do they really need help?"; "Negroes have gained more than entitled
to recently"; and "Negroes shouldn't push themselves where they're
not wanted" (Kinder, 1986).
< For old fashioned racism, scales used included items such as:
~ "On average, African-Americanslblacks, have worse jobs, Income,
and housing than whites because most African-Americanslblacks are
•
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not as capable as whites"; "We would have fewer social problems if
people of the same ethnic background lived and worked with people
like themselves"; and "The black community would be better off if it
formed its own social and political institutions such as schools, banks,
and police force" (Reyna et aI., 2006).
~ White people seem to get more of the good things in life because:
"The differences are brought on by God; God made races different as
part of his divine plan"; "Blacks come from a less able race and this
explains why blacks are not as well off as whites in America"
(Sidanius, Devereux & Pratto, 1991; Tarman & Sears, 2005).
< For racial affect, the standard feeling thermometer was the most popular
measurement used. Participants were asked to rate their feelings (toward
blacks) on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with high scores indicating more
positive affect (e.g., Bobo, 1998; Reyna et aI., 2006; Sidanius, Devereux &
Pratto, 1991). Only Durrheim (2003) used a different scale, which had two
items asking white participants the following questions: "Have you ever felt
sympathy for black/Indian/white people living here?"; and "Have you ever
felt admiration for black/Indian/white people living here?"
< For the stereotypes scale, expressions or stereotypical beliefs such as
"blacks are lazy", "blacks are more violent than whites", "blacks are less
intelligent than whites", "blacks are hard to get along with" or "blacks are
born with less in-born ability to learn", were coded for analysis (see
Sniderman & Carmines, 1997 and Sniderman & Piazza, 1993, for example).
Racial policy - actual policies implemented by the government so as to eradicate
racial discrimination and promote racial equality and equality of opportunity
•
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(e.g., affirmative action, busing, fair housing laws, Reconstruction and
Development Programmes, the Discrimination Act and the Employment Equity
Act).
• Racial policy type, that is, the different categories in which racial policies fall:
< Preferential treatment policies - e.g., employment quotas (especially
preferential hiring and promotion of blacks), college admission quotas,
national sports team quotas and giving preferential contracts and tax breaks
to black businesses.
< Compensatory programmes - e.g., policies that involve spending more
money on schools in largely black neighbourhoods, awarding college
scholarships to "deserving" black students and giving a job offer to a black
individual instead of an equally qualified white individual.
< Desegregation policies - such as busing and fair housing laws - promoting
racial integration.
< General legal policies - policies that are not clearly defmed, for example,
when the researcher simply asked participants how they feel toward
affirmative action in general (e.g., Konrad & Spitz, 2003; Sears & Henry,
2003; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996) or when participants are simply
asked their opinion about policies promoting equality (which might include
a whole range of programmes, for example, from as fair job treatment, to
school integration) (e.g., Sears et al., 1997).






• Race of participants or some kind of description of the individual sample(s) used
in each study.
• Where the study was done.
All the coded information was considered important when looking for moderator variables
later at the analysis stage, which could explain variation. It is also important for the
description of the study set retrieved.
3.8 Data collection
There are a number of ways that can be used to locate research studies for a meta-analysis.
According to Hunter and Schmidt (1990), one can do this by "examining indices to
documents, searching existing bibliographies, and querying other scholars who might be
familiar with appropriate studies" (p. 490). For the present research study purposes, the
methods discussed below were used for data collection.
3.8.1 Literature search
3.8.1.1 Sources
Before starting searching for studies, a set of important keywords to be used to do the
literature search was determined. Such keywords included the following phrases: racial
policy opinion/attitudes, preferential treatment policies, race-targeted policies, compensatory
racial policies, race attitudes, symbolic racism, old-fashioned racism, racial affect, racial
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stereotypes, school or residential integration/segregation/desegregation, busing attitudes,
affirmative action policies/programmes and affirmative action attitudes.
Several sources were used for literature search. Firstly, electronic databases were used. These
include Ebscohost, PsychInfo (computerised bibliographic database), Social Sciences
Citation Index (SSCI - CD-ROM), TELNET OPAC - the University library electronic
catalogue and Google.
With Ebscohost and Google, sometimes it is possible to get a whole article, whereas at times
it just gives you an abstract. Where there were whole articles (e.g. Durrheim, 2003; Federico
& Sidanius, 2002; Kluegel & Smith, 1983), the meta-analyst skim read them first and looked
at the reported statistics to determine whether or not they were potentially relevant to the
study. With abstracts, they were read through to see if they were potentially relevant to the
study. If so, they were ordered through the inter-library loan services offered at the University
of KwaZulu-Natal (Pietermaritzburg) Library, that is, if the article was not in the library
itself. Inter-library loan allows for search of the articles nationwide as well as the British
Library.
Psychlnfo only gives psychological abstracts. Therefore the abovementioned procedure for
abstracts had to be followed. The Social Sciences Citation Index - also accessed from the
University computer LAN (local area network) and libraries is most useful for finding the
most recent material on a topic and identifying work in other disciplines (if there is a cross-
citation) that may otherwise be missed. However, SSCI, just like PsychInfo, only gives
abstracts; therefore, the meta-analyst had to follow the same procedure explained above
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(under Ebscohost and Google). Using TELNET OPAC, I only managed to find a few articles
that could be used for analysis.
Secondly, review articles (e.g. Krysan, 2000; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986a, 1986b; Stoker,
1996) were important sources since they mentioned studies related to the topic that could be
looked into. Thirdly, some of the relevant studies used for analysis also mentioned related
studies that dealt with the same topic, hence making the literature search task somewhat
easIer.
Lastly, in order to counter the file drawer problem, several authors who have published
papers in the same field were contacted bye-mail (refer to Appendix 2 for a full list of
authors e-mailed and the letter send to them). E-mail addresses were sourced off the Internet
and authors were provided with a full list of references of the 24 articles already on the
database and asked if they knew of any other papers, both published and unpublished, that
were not mentioned on the list. There was a 40% response rate from the 35 contacted authors,
with some authors sending references of potentially relevant studies, other giving references
to already discarded studies (those decided to be irrelevant for one reason or another) and
other authors such as P. 1. Henry, David Kravitz and David Sears sending full articles of
published and unpublished (or still to be published) studies. Some authors (e.g. Michael Giles
and Thomas Piazza, Colette van Laar) also reported that they did not have any or did not
know of any other papers, published or unpublished, that could be relevant.
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3.8.1.2. Criteria for inclusion and exclusion
Over 70 studies were located, but only 28 were selected for analysis. The 28 studies were
included in the analysis mainly for the following reasons:
• The studies investigated a relationship between some measure of racial prejudice
and racial policies, specifically dealing with the relationship between racial
prejudice and racial policy attitudes.
• Studies that used quantitative methods of analysis, preferably with Pearson's r
statistic reported or any other statistic that could be transformed to r.
Those studies that were excluded, they were excluded mainly on the following grounds:
• The way they were reported, analysed, content - without a direct link between
racial prejudice and racial policy attitudes (e.g. some studies were concerned with
the differences in attitudes towards racial policy opinion between men and
women; personal experience with discrimination (not necessarily racial) and
attitudes towards racial policies; attitudes towards racial policies in the
workplace, but not directly concerned with the role played by racial prejudice in
shaping those attitudes; political conservatism, individualism, self-interest, etc, on
racial policies (non-racial explanations for opposition or support for racial
policies)).
• Sometimes irrelevant:
< Not enough information available to allow for transformation to the r
statistic, in cases where results were reported using a different statistic.
< Because they did not have any statistical information reported (especially
review articles).
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However some of those studies that were not suitable for the database were actually very, .
important for literature review (e.g. Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Krysan, 2000; Sniderrnan and
Tetlock, 1986a, 1986b; Stoker, 1996).
3.9 Ethical Issues
In view of the fact that all the 28 studies used in the meta-analysis, published or not, were
referenced (See Appendix 1 and also refer to the reference list for full references), no other
major ethical issues were left to consider.
3.10 Data Analysis
According to the Hunter-Schrnidt (1990) model, there are seven steps to follow when
conducting a meta-analysis. The first step is to collect the population of studies, which was
done for the present study. Variables of interest mentioned in section 3.7 above were noted,
and data for each was collected/coded from all the studies (i.e. the second step). The third
step is to transform all statistics across studies to a common statistics, in this case, Pearson's
r. However, since the studies collected for the present study were already reported as r
statistics, which is usually the case with correlation studies, there was no need to do any
transformations.
The fourth step is the calculation of the mean value and the variance of the statistic across
studies. When calculating the mean and variance, each component statistic was weighted by
sample size so as to give more weight to studies with bigger sample sizes, since statistic
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estimates are more reliable when based on larger samples. In the present study, effect sizes
were accordingly weighted with their corresponding sample sizes as suggested. The fifth step
is correction for sampling error, which was done using equation number 6 under subsection
3.10.1.1. The sixth step is correction for measurement error and restriction of range, which
was omitted in this case mainly because of lack of enough information from studies to allow
for calculation of these statistics (see below for further discussion concerning these two
artefacts).
Finally, according to Hunter and Schrnidt (1990), if the corrected variance of the common
statistic is significant, then we conclude that real differences exist between studies. At this
point, the last step is implemented, which is the use of moderator variables to find potential
sources of variation. In this study, after calculating the overall relevant statistics, effect sizes
were further partitioned according to the racial attitude measures used (symbolic and old-
fashioned racism, racial affect and stereotypes) and relevant statistics were calculated. The
meta-analyst then decided to analyse the effect of the different racial policy types involved
(i.e. preferential, compensatory desegregation and general policies). Finally, in order to make
further comparisons a technique almost similar to a 4 (four levels of racial policies) x 4 (four
levels of racial attitudes) analysis of variance was adopted and an analysis was made
accordingly.
Not all researchers agree with Hunter and Schrnidt, however, concerning the calculation of
measurement error and range restriction. Moreover, there are problems associated with the
correction of both artefacts. The problem with the calculation of measurement error mainly
sterns from the issue of data availability. Not all researchers report information on scale
reliability (which is what the meta-analyst will need to calculate measurement error) or
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unrestricted standard deviation (necessary for range restriction correction). According to
Tredoux (2002), even when you do have the right infonnation, the correction for
measurement error can become quite complex. In the case of range restriction, there is rarely
any data available to allow for this correction. Furthennore, range restriction is not a typical
problem for social science research. Tredoux also pointed out that many authors dispute the
validity of measurement and restriction of range corrections.
Whereas Hunter and Schmidt (1990) argue that there is no need to transfonn the raw
correlation to Fisher z before doing the final analysis since the mean statistics (when using
the Fisher z transfonned correlation) tends to be biased upwards; Lipsey and Wilson (2001)
disagree and say that the correlation effect size in its raw fonn is too restrictive or
conservative and tends to yield mean effect sizes that are lower than they should be (and
wider confidence intervals (Field, 2001)). Lipsey and Wilson also argue that the calculation
of the standard error needed to calculate the inverse variance is problematic when using r;
hence the transfonnation to Fisher z correlation is essential. According to Lipsey and Wilson
(2001; http://mason.gmu.edu/~dwilsonb/downloads/analysis_overheads.ppt) the standard
error is a direct indicator of the precision of an effect size, i.e., the smaller the standard error,
the more precise the effect size. Additionally, they claim that although weighting each effect
size by the corresponding sample size (Hunter-Schmidt's approach) so as to give more
weight to bigger effect sizes is important, it is the simple approach. Apparently the better
approach involves the use of the inverse variance for weighting effect sizes
(http://mason.gmu.edu/~dwilsonbldownloadslanalysis_overheads.ppt). For the present meta-
analysis, in order to make a compromise between the two, a decision was made to analyse
both the untransfonned correlation (r) and the transfonned Fisher z correlation (Zr). That
way, comparisons could be made and help add more validation to the meta-analytic study
55
itself and, importantly, to also test the validity of Hunter-Schrnidt and Lipsey-Wilson
arguments stated above.
The transformation from r to Fisher z was made using Microsoft Excel's build-in function.
Lipsey and Wilson (2001) provided information on the relevant steps followed when doing
data analysis using the transformed Fisher z correlation (see also
http://mason.gmu.edul~dwilsonb/downloads/analysis _overheads.ppt). Similar to the Hunter-
Schrnidt approach, a mean weighted effect size had to be calculated. Only here the procedure
differs slightly since standard error was calculated first, then using the standard error the
inverse variance was calculated, which was later used to calculate the weighted mean effect
size and subsequent relevant statistics. After calculating the appropriate statistics, the results
were transformed back to r for interpretation, as recommended. Data were partitioned using
the same method used for the Hunter-Schrnidt model (i.e. racial attitudes; racial policy type;
and the racial attitude by racial policy type interaction).
Another important point of note is the argument surrounding the use of more than one
statistic or effect size from the same study, i.e., non-independent samples. Those who argue
against it say that this method violates the assumption of independence especially in two
ways: in some cases the same subjects are counted repeatedly (thus, inflating N) and in other
cases each separate effect size loses its independence when more than one effect size comes
from the same study. Thus, authors such as Hedges and Holkin (1985, as cited in Hedges,
1986) have suggested that meta-analysts should either choose, randomly, one estimate or take
the median of reported effect sizes to represent a particular study. However, Lipsey and
Wilson (2001,) point out that there is another alternative. Instead ofjust taking one effect size
per study, it is also possible to take one effect size per subsample within a study. Cooper and
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Lindsay (1997) also say that meta-analysts can decide to deal with the non-independence
problem in a number of ways. A researcher may decide to treat each effect size
independently, regardless of the number of effect sizes sourced from the same study - this
approach assumes that the effect of the violation of independence is not too great. Another
approach involves the use of the particular study in question as a unit of analysis - here a
mean or median result is calculated and taken to represent that particular study. A third
approach allows each study to "contribute as many effects as there are categories in the given
analysis, but effects within the categories are averaged" (Cooper & Lindsay, 1997, p. 331).
For the purposes of the present study, in most cases, more than one effect size was sourced
from the same study; hence the 216 correlation effect sizes yielded from only 28 studies. The
reason for this was because although the same sample may have been tested on a single
construct (e.g., race attitudes), more than one measure of the construct was used (i.e.,
symbolic racism, old-fashioned racism, racial affect and stereotypes). To illustrate this point,
take for example, a study (e.g., Durrheim, 2003) that tested respondents on symbolic racism,
old-fashioned racism and racial affect; it would be impractical to average the results from
such an analysis during the data collection phase since it distorts important information (on
the different levels of race attitudes) that is needed for analytic purposes later, and therefore,
basically defeating the purpose of the present meta-analytic study.
Nevertheless, before doing the overall analysis, all effect sizes sourced from the same sample
within a study were averaged so as to avoid the sample size inflation. Therefore, the number
of effect sizes used to calculate the weighted mean across all studies was reduced to 75, with
a total sample size ofN = 49 677 and an unweighted correlation mean of 0.2232. The number
of correlations (75) remains higher than the number of studies (28) merely because some
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studies, e.g., Sears and Henry (2003), Bobo (1983), Sears, van Laar, Carrillo and Kosterman
(1997) Sniderman and Carmines (1997) and Sears and Allen (1984) used more than one
sample in their studies. Therefore, after taking one effect size from each sample involved,
sometimes that resulted in say three effect sizes being collected from a single study even after
averagmg.
When calculating the mean across the different race attitudes, racial polices, and interactions
between these two variables, effect sizes were also averaged accordingly so as to avoid the
non-independence of samples.
Prior to the actual final analysis, a diagnostic analysis was conducted. This preliminary
exploration of data allowed the meta-analyst to look for outliers and correct data entry errors.
In cases where there were outliers, the effect sizes were double-checked against the original
study to make sure there were no mistakes made during data entry. A general descriptive
analysis of the data was also carried out in order to gain an initial impression of the data
(refer to Appendix 3). Scatters plot and histograms were generated for the data (see Appendix
3) using the raw correlations obtained from studies. Stem-and-Ieaf plots were also generated
(see Appendix 3).
3.10.1 Statistics calculated and some ofthe formulas used
Due to lack of appropriate statistical packages (or at least none that the meta-analyst could
find access to), all calculations were done using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Since data
were already saved in Excel during the data collection phase, it made the task fairly easier
since no transfers were required. Formulae were added in where appropriate and double-
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checks were made to ensure accuracy. However, some of the graphs (see graphs in Appendix
3) were prepared using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) programme.
The statistics calculated and some ofthe formulas used for calculation are outlined below.
3.10.1.1 Hunter-Schmidt Model
1. The sample weighted mean correlation formula:
Where Ni is the number of subjects in the study, and ri is the effect size for the
individual study. The sample weighted mean correlation is defined by the following
variance formula:
2. Observed variance:
3. Standard Deviation (sr) = Square root of s/
4. Total Sample Size (N) = In;
5. Average N = N / K
Where K is the number of studies in the analysis.
6. Estimated Sampling Error Variance (Se/) = (l - ;:-2)2/ (Ave N - 1)
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7. Estimated Population Variance (cr/) = s? - Se? = s? - (1 - r 2i / (Ave N - 1)
8. Estimated Population Standard Deviation (crp) = Square root of crp
2
9. 95% Confidence intervals (see Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).
10. A Chi-square test was used to test for systematic variation (which is useful in
determining whether or not there is a moderator variable present).
2 N 2
AK _ 1= 2 2 Sr(1 - r )
Where K is the number of studies in the analysis. If the Chi-Square is not statistically
significant, then no moderator variable is present. Statistically this is a very powerful
test, and given a large enough N, it will reject the null hypothesis even if there is only
trivial variation among studies. Alternatively Hunter and Schmidt (1990) give a rule of
thumb, in which S2r and S2er are compared. If the error variance accounts for less than
75% of the uncorrected variance, then a moderator variable may be present.
3.10.1.2 Fisher z transformation
1. Transformation from r to Fisher z:
[







3. Inverse Variance Weight:
1
W Zr =-2- = n - 3SEZr
4. Mean effect size:
-ES = .=L=-:(=w:--xE_S_)
Lw
5. Other statistics calculated include:
• Standard error of the mean.
• 95% Confidence intervals.
• Z test for the mean effect size.
• Homogeneity Q (Qcalc), degrees of freedom (df) and the corresponding critical
value (QcriD.
(Refer to http://mason.gmu.edu/~dwilsonb/down1oads/analysis_overheads.ppt and
Lipsey & Wilson (2001) for the actual formulas).
Finally, all statistics were then appropriately transformed back, from Fisher z to r (referred to






I started off by analysing overall effect size statistics (for both r and Fisher Zr) so as to gain
an overall understanding of the data. Next, data were partitioned in accordance with the racial
attitude scale used (i.e., racial affect, stereotypes, symbolic and old-fashioned racism) and
analysed. After that, all data were grouped in terms of the racial policy type (i.e., preferential,
compensatory, desegregation and legal (general) policies) and analysed. Finally, data were
partitioned in a 4 (four levels of racial policy types) x 4 (four levels of racial attitude scales)
manner, similar to analysis of variance (ANQVA), so as to make cross-comparisons.
4.1 Overall analysis
The first step was to make an overall analysis of all the data collected (K = 75, N = 49 677,
i.e., after averaging multiple effect sizes from a single study) in order to gain a better
understanding of the dataset and be able to make comparisons. Results were presented for
both the untransformed r correlations and transformed Fisher Zr (with higher correlations
indicating higher opposition to race-targeted policies).
Table 1 shows the results yielded after calculating statistics across all studies using the
formulas recommended by Hunter and Schmidt (1990).
So as to give more weight to studies with bigger sample sizes, as recommended by Hunter
and Schmidt (1990), individual correlations were weighted by their corresponding sample
sizes. As indicated in Table 1, the weighted mean correlation was r = 0.2263 (versus the
unweighted mean r = 0.2232) with a standard deviation of 0.1167 (versus the uncorrected
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standard deviation of 0.1323). The variation from the overall correlations is not trivial in
amount relative to the mean, and this suggests a need for a search for moderator variables.





Estimated Samp. Err. Var. 0.0014
Total N 49677
K (number of statistics) 75
AveN 662
Est. Pop. Var. 0.0123
Estimated Pop. Stand. Dev. 0.1107








0.00001P (for X )
aalpha = 0.05
Although there is considerable controversy concerning the issue of assigning qualitative
descriptions to effect sizes (e.g., a small change in attitudes and/or behaviour maybe of
crucial importance in one context, but quite trivial in another), it is still useful to have some
guide to interpretation. The rule of thumb suggested by Cohen (1988, as cited in Cooper and
Lindsay, 1997) says that an r value of .1 should be considered as small, an r value of .3 is
medium and r of .5 is large. Therefore, using Cohen's suggestions, the overall mean
correlation of r = 0.2263 in this meta-analysis shows that there is a small to medium
relationship between racial prejudice on racial policy attitudes.
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The 95% confidence interval also shows that the mean obtained is statistically significant:
(a = 0.05) = r ± 1.96 * s/ = 0.2263 ± 1.96 * 0.0136
= 0.1996 and 0.2530
If the variation in the effect size were normally distributed, then 95% of the settings would
have effect sizes in the range 0.1996 to 0.2530, with a width of 0.0534. Additionally, since 0
does not fall in between the lower and upper confidence intervals, we can therefore conclude
there is a statistically significant relationship between racial prejudice and racial policy
attitudes.
Next, an analysis was done using the Fisher Zr transformation (which shall be referred to as
the fixed effects model henceforth) so as to make a comparison between the two methods of
analysis. Table 2 below represents the results yielded from this analysis.
Table 2: Overall analysis - Transformed Fisher Zr
Statistic Fisher z Zra
Mean 0.2345 0.2303
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0045 0.0045
Z test for mean ES 52.1383 -
95% Upper 0.2433 0.2386
Confid.
Interval Lower 0.2256 0.2219
Qcalc 833.9670 -
Qcrit 95.08 -
p (for Q) 0.00001 -
Note: alpha (for Q and confidence mtervals) = 0.05; K, N, Average N and degrees of freedom remain
the same as for the Hunter-Schmidt model.
3Results were transformed back to correlation r after analysis.
Results from the fixed effects model show a slightly higher mean correlation Zr = 0.2345
(after back transformation) compared to the obtained mean of 0.2263 using the Hunter-
Schmidt model. The Hunter-Schmidt method is often criticised by some authors for being
64
overly conservative, therefore yielding lower mean correlations than would be expected; and
the reverse is true for Fisher Zr transformation. The 95% confidence interval, 0.2256 to
0.2433, shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between racial prejudice and
opinions towards race-targeted policies since it does not include zero. The z test for the mean
effect size supports this result, z = 52.1383 far exceeds 1.96, and, thus, significant at alpha
level 0.05.
The chi-square test was also statistically significant for both methods indicating that there
maybe moderator variables present (third factors that influence the relationship of interest),
requiring further investigation. Thus, the set of studies were broken into subsets using
possible moderator variables and meta-analysis was then performed on each subset of studies.
Large differences between subsets were taken as an indication that the variable was indeed a
moderator variable.
4.2 Racial attitudes
Since I was interested in finding out whether or not and to what extent racial attitudes play a
role in influencing racial policy attitudes, racial attitude scales were then identified as a
possible source of variation that needed to be investigated further. All the effect size statistics
that were initially collected (K = 216, N = 187 191, i.e., before averaging) were partitioned
into four different subsets (for both the transformed and untransformed effect sizes), in
accordance with the corresponding racial prejudice measure; effect sizes from the same
sample in a study were then averaged so as to avoid sample size inflation. The results
indicated that the racial attitude scales used were indeed a valid moderator variable (see
Tables 3 and 4). There is also a substantial difference in weighted means, showing a
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difference between the subsets analysed. Refer to subsections 4.2.1 - 4.2.4 below for a more
detailed discussion of the results.
dU t, d'fT bl 3 Ma e : easures 0 race prelU lce- n rans orme r
Statistic Symbolic Old- Racial Stereotypes
Fashioned Affect
Meanr 0.3218 0.1722 0.1914 0.2515
Observed Variance 0.0153 0.0159 0.0145 0.0078
Stand. Dev. 0.1238 0.1259 0.1203 0.0883
Est. Samp. Err. Var. 0.0011 0.0013 0.0014 0.0012
Total N 29511 32231 10 168 8505
K 39 44 15 12
AveN 757 733 678 709
Est. Pop. Var. 0.0143 0.0146 0.0131 0.0066
Est. Pop. Stand. Dev. 0.1194 0.1207 0.1145 0.0810
95% Lower 0.2918 0.1410 0.1630 0.2362
Confidence
Interval Upper 0.3518 0.2034 0.2199 0.2668
2
503.6767 528.1336 153.0426 70.8184X calc
2:
53.3835 59.30 23.6848X crit 19.6752
df 38 43 14 11

















Symbolic Old-fashioned Affect Stereotypes
Race attitude
Figure 1: Race prejudice measures: weighted means
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Table 4: Measures of race prejudice - Transformed Fisher Zr
Attitude Measure Statistic Fisher z Zr
Symbolic Mean 0.3408 0.3282
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0058 0.0058
Z test for mean ES 58.4343 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.3523 0.3384




Old-fashioned Mean 0.1772 0.1753
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0056 0.0056
Z test for mean ES 31.7397 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.1881 0.1859




Racial Affect Mean 0.1957 0.1932
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0099 0.0099
Z test for mean ES 19.6851 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.2151 0.2119




Stereotypes Mean 0.2602 0.2545
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0109 0.0109
Z test for mean ES 23.9427 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.2815 0.2743








K = 39 correlations (N = 29 511) were obtained for the symbolic racism measure and meta-
analysed. As illustrated in Table 3 above the weighted mean correlation is highest when using
the symbolic racism scale, compared to the other three racial attitude scales. The weighted
mean correlation for the symbolic racism measure was r = 0.3218, with a corrected
population variance of G/ = 0.0143 and a standard deviation of Gp 0.1194 (see Table 3). The
confidence intervals obtained, 0.2918 to 0.3518, show that the mean correlation was
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The chi-square test results also came out
significant (X
2
= 503.6767, df = 38, p = 0.00001), suggesting that the variation In
correlations from studies, using the symbolic racism scale, cannot all be attributed to
sampling error; therefore further investigation is needed (to look for more moderators). See
section 4.4.1 below for a further exploration of moderator variables.
Results from the fixed effects model, corroborate the trend observed in the overall analysis
results, in the sense that statistics are still slightly higher when analysed using this method.
Weighted means for the different racial attitude scales also correspond with what was found
from the Hunter-Schmidt model, with the symbolic racism scale yielding the highest mean
(Zr = 0.3282), followed by the stereotypes scale (Zr = 0.2545), then the racial affect scale
mean (Zr = 0.1932) and finally the old-fashioned racism scale mean (Zr = 0.1753).
The confidence intervals, 0.3294 to 0.3523, indicate that there is a statistically significant
relationship between symbolic racism and racial policy attitudes. The homogeneity test was
also statistically significant (Q = 611.9223, df = 38, P = 0.00001) revealing the possible
presence of moderator variables within the symbolic racism scale (See section 4.4.1 below).
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4.2.2 Old-fashioned racism
44 correlations (N = 32 231) were obtained from studies using the old-fashioned racism scale
and were meta-analysed. Referring back to Table 3 above, the old-fashioned racism scale's
weighted mean correlation r= 0.1722 (J/ = 0.0146, (Jp = 0.1207) is the lowest mean when
compared to all the other racial attitude scales. The 95% confidence interval, 0.1410 to
0.2034, shows that the mean effect size obtained was statistically significant, since the
interval does not include zero. Even though the variation may look a bit small within the old-
fashioned racism subset, it was decided that it might be worth looking further into so as to see
if there were any moderator variables present (see section 4.4.2 below). The chi-square test
also confirmed this opinion since the results were statistically significant (X
2
= 528.1336, df
= 43, P = 0.00001), suggesting a possible presence of moderators.
Using the fixed effects model, the weighted mean Zr = 0.1753 was lowest when using the
old-fashioned racism scale. Since the confidence interval, 0.1647 to 0.1859, does not include
zero, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that a statistically significant correlation
exists between old-fashioned racism and racial policy opinions. The statistically significant
homogeneity test (Q = 611.6874, df = 43, P = 0.00001) revealed a possible presence of
moderators within the old-fashioned racism scale.
4.2.3 Racial affect
For the racial affect scale, 15 correlations (N = 10 168) were yielded for meta-analysis. The
racial affect scale's weighted mean correlation of r = 0.1914, with a corrected population
variance of (J/ = 0.0131 and a standard deviation of (Jp = 0.1145, is the third highest when
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comparing it to all the other racial prejudice measures (see Table 3). Since the confidence
interval, 0.1630 to 0.2199, does not include 0, we therefore reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that there is a statistically significant relationship between racial affect and racial
policy attitudes. The chi-square test was also statistically significant (X
2
= 153.0426, df =
14, P = 0.00001), suggesting a possible presence of moderators. Notably, almost all studies
(except for Durrheim, 2003) that used the racial affect scale obtained the correlations using
the 'Feeling Thermometer' that most researchers seem to favour when looking at this
particular racism construct.
The fixed effects model yielded an effect size slightly higher, weighted mean Zr = 0.1932,
which was the third highest (same as the mean from the Hunter-Schmidt model) on the racial
attitude scale variable. The confidence interval, 0.1744 to 0.2119, did not include zero,
indicating that there is a statistically significant relationship between racial affect and racial
policy attitudes. The homogeneity test was also statistically significant (Q = 152.9613, df =
34, p = 0.00001) signifying the possible presence of moderators within the old-fashioned
racism scale (See section 4.4.3 below).
4.2.4 Stereotypes
From the relevant studies, 12 stereotype scale correlations were yielded for analyses, based
on N = 8 505 participants. The Hunter-Schmidt model stereotypes scale's weighted mean
correlation of r = 0.2515, was the second highest as compared to all the other racial attitudes
scales (see Table 2). The corresponding corrected population variance was (J/ = 0.0066, with
corrected standard deviation of (Jp = 0.0810. The confidence interval, 0.2362 to 0.2668, does
not include zero, therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a
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statistically significant correlation between stereotypes and racial policy attitudes at the 95%
confidence level. The chi-square test (X
2
= 70.8184, df = 11), P = 0.00001) was also
statistically significant showing that a moderator variable may be present.
Analogous to the Hunter-Schmidt model, the fixed effects model stereotypes scale's weighted
mean of Zr = 0.2545 was second highest on the racial attitude scales. The confidence interval,
0.2344 to 0.2743, does not include zero, therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude
that the obtained weighted mean correlation is statistically significant. The homogeneity test
was statistically significant (Q = 88.9246, df = 11, p = 0.00001); thus, variation across effect
sizes exceeds what would be expected based on sampling error. In other words, there maybe
moderator variables present that can explain the additional variance. Refer to section 4.4.4
below.
4.3 Racial policy type
Since previous research seems to suggest that people react differently to different racial
policies depending on how they perceive them, further investigation into the effect of policy
type as a moderator variable was deemed appropriate. All the original 216 correlation effect
sizes were divided into four different subsets, according to their corresponding racial policy
type (preferential, compensatory, desegregation and general legal policies) and then
appropriately averaged to avoid sample size inflation. 24 correlations (N = 17 630) were
analysed for preferential treatment, 11 (N = 6 356) for compensatory programmes, 29 (N =
23 981) for desegregation and 29 (N = 18 990) for general policies. Results are discussed in
detail in subsections 4.3.1 - 4.3.4 below.
Table 5: Policy type - Untransformed r
Statistic Preferential Compensatory!Desegregation Legal
Meanr 0.2132 0.2091 0.2204 0.2395
Observed Variance 0.0153 0.0110 0.0045 0.0218
Stand. Dev. 0.1235 0.1 049 0.0670 0.1475
Est. Samp. Err. Var. 0.0012 0.0016 0.0012 0.0014
Total N 17630 6356 23981 18990
K 24 11 29 29
AveN 735 578 762 655
Est. Pop. Var. 0.0140 0.0094 0.0033 0.0204
Est. Pop. Stand. Dev. 0.1184 0.0971 0.0575 0.1429
95% Lower 0.1832 0.1875 0.2116 0.1968
Con.
Interval Upper 0.2432 0.2307 0.2292 0.2820
2
282.5836 73.1127 113.4242X calc 439.1731
2
35.1725 41.3372X crit 18.3070 41.3372
df 23 10 28 28



















Figure 2: Racial policy type: Weighted mean effect sizes
Table 6: Policy type - Transformed Fisher Zr
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Racial Policy Tvpe Statistic Fisher z Zr
Preferential Mean 0.2216 0.2180
Stand. Err. Ofmean 0.0075 0.0075
Z test for mean ES 29.3607 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.2364 0.2321




Compensatory Mean 0.2142 0.2109
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0126 0.0126
Z test for mean ES 17.0297 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.2388 0.2344




Desegregation Mean 0.2252 0.2215
Stand. Err. Ofmean 0.0067 0.0067
Z test for mean ES 33.4207 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.2384 0.2340




Legal Mean 0.2508 0.2456
Stand. Err. Ofmean 0.0073 0.0073
Z test for mean ES 34.4778 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.2650 0.2590





4.3.1 Preferential treatment policies
24 (N = 17 630) effect sizes from studies using preferential treatment policies were meta-
analysed. From Table 5 above, it is clear that the weighted means are slightly different
between the groups. Unexpectedly though, the weighted mean correlation r = 0.2132 for the
preferential treatment policies was third highest (see Table 5). The corresponding population
variance was (J/ = 0.0140, with a standard deviation of (Jp = 0.1184. As illustrated by the
confidence interval, 0.1832 to 0.2432, there is a statistically significant relationship between
preferential treatment policies and racial policy attitudes at the 95% confidence level. The
corresponding chi-square test (X
2
= 282.5836, df = 23, p = 0.00001) indicated that a
moderator variable maybe present.
Using the fixed effects model, preferential treatment policies still obtained the third highest
mean of Zr = 0.2180. The confidence interval, 0.2068 to 0.2364, shows that there is a
statistically significant relationship between preferential treatment programmes and racial
policy opinions. The homogeneity test was statistically significant (Q = 343.1553, df= 23, p
= 0.00001) showing that there may be a moderator variable present.
4.3.2 Compensatory policies
11 (N = 6 356) correlations containing compensatory policies were obtained and meta-
analysed. The weighted mean correlation r = 0.2091 for the compensatory programmes was
the lowest, with a population variance of (J/ = 0.0094 and a standard deviation of (Jp =
0.0971. The confidence interval, 0.1875 to 0.2307, indicates the existence of a statistically
significant relationship between compensatory policies and attitudes towards race-targeted
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policies. The corresponding chi-square test (X = 73.1127, df = 10, p = 0.00001) was
statistically significant, indicating that a moderator variable maybe present.
Using the fixed effects model, compensatory programmes also obtained the lowest mean Zr =
0.2109. Since zero does not fall in the range between 0.1873 and 0.2344, we can reject the
null hypothesis and conclude that there is a statistically significant relationship between
compensatory policies and racial policy attitudes at the 95% confidence level. The
homogeneity test was also statistically significant (Q = 78.7956, df = 10, P = 0.00001)
showing that there may be a moderator variable present.
4.3.3 Desegregation
29 (N = 23 981) effect sizes from studies that included desegregation policies were meta-
analysed. The weighted mean correlation r = 0.2204 for desegregation policies was the
second highest (see Table 5). The corresponding population variance was (J/ = 0.0033, with
a standard deviation of (Jp = 0.0575. As illustrated by the confidence interval, 0.2116 to
0.2292, there is a statistically significant relationship between desegregation policies and
racial policy attitudes at the 95% confidence level. The corresponding chi-square test (X
2
=
113.4242, df= 28, P = 0.00001) indicated that a moderator variable maybe present.
Using the fixed effects model, desegregation policies also yielded the second highest mean Zr
= 0.2215. The confidence interval, 0.2089 to 0.2340, shows that there is a statistically
significant relationship between preferential treatment programmes and racial policy
opinions. The homogeneity test was statistically significant (Q = 11 0.2122, df = 28, p =
0.00001) showing that there may be a moderator variable present.
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4.3.4 General legal policies
29 (N = 18 990) correlation effect sizes were meta-analysed. General policies yielded the
highest weighted mean correlation of r = 0.2395, compared to the other three groups - which
was unexpected, with a population variance of (J/ = 0.0204 and a standard deviation of (Jp =
0.1429). The confidence interval test, 0.1968 to 0.2820, indicated that there is a statistically
significant relationship between general legal policies and racial policy attitudes. The chi-
square test (X
2
= 439.1731, df= 28, P = 0.00001) was statistically significant showing that a
moderator variable may be present.
Similar to the Hunter-Schmidt model, the fixed effects model general policies' weighted
mean of Zr = 0.2456 was the highest, compared to the other two racial policy types. The
confidence interval, 0.2322 to 0.2590, does not include 0, showing that there is a statistically
,
significant relationship between general legal policies and racial policy opinions. The
homogeneity test came out statistically significant (Q = 498.6874, df = 28, P = 0.00001).
Thus, variation across effect sizes exceeds what would be expected based on sampling error,
meaning that a moderat.or variable may be present that could explain the additional variance.
4.3 Racial attitudes by racial policy type
Finally, the racial prejudice by racial policy interaction was identified as another potential
source of variation; hence meta-analysis was performed after the appropriate partitioning was
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Figure 3: Racial attitudes by policy type
Legend:
• Sym Symbolic Racism
• Old Old-fashioned Racism
• Affect Racial Affect
• Stereo Stereotypes
• Pref Preferential Treatment Programmes
• Comp Compensatory Programmes
• Deseg Desegregation
• Leg Legal (General) Policies
Table 7: Racial attitudes by Racial policy type (weighted mean statistiCs)
Racial Attitude Symbolic Old-fashioned Affect Stereotypes
Policy type
Preferential r 0.3743 (16) 0.1115 (14) 0.1795 (5) 0.2334 (6)
Zr 0.3819 0.1128 0.1800 0.2373
Compensatory r 0.2418 (4) 0.2096 (9) 0.19 (1)a _(0)0
Zr 0.3167 0.2103 0.1923 -
Desegregation r 0.2651 (19) 0.1732(11) 0.1545 (6) 0.1884 (4)
Zr 0.2673 0.1744 0.1560 0.1893
Legal r 0.4523 (11) 0.1970 (23) 0.2702 (8) 0.2712 (4)
Zr 0.4655 0.2035 0.2718 0.2713
Note: FIgures m parenthesIs are the correspondmg number of correlatIOns analysed (k) m each subset.
aOnly one effect size yielded for analysis.
"No effect sizes yielded for the stereotypes by compensatory interaction.
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4.4.1 Symbolic racism by racial policy type
As illustrated in Table 7, the symbolic racism by policy type interaction (using the Hunter-
Schmidt model) yielded the highest weighted mean correlations at almost all levels. The
correlation mean r = 0.4523 for symbolic racism by general legal policies was the highest
overall (compared to all the other scales), followed by symbolic racism by preferential
treatment r = 0.3743, then the symbolic racism by desegregation policies r = 0.2651 and
finally symbolic racism by compensatory programmes r = 0.2418. Refer to table 8 below for
detailed analysis and Figure 3 above for a graphical representation. All the confidence
interval tests (see Table 8) were statistically significant at all levels showing that the obtained
mean correlations were significant at the 95% confidence level. The chi-square test was also
statistically significant for all policy types (refer to Table 8 for relevant figures) suggesting
the presence of moderator variables.
Just like the Hunter-Schmidt model's results, the fixed effects model showed that the
symbolic racism by general legal policies interaction had the highest mean Zr = 0.4655. The
second highest was the symbolic racism by preferential treatment interaction (mean Zr =
0.3819), followed by the symbolic racism by compensatory programmes interaction (mean Zr
= 0.3167), and finally symbolic racism by desegregation policies, mean Zr = 0.2673. All the
confidence interval tests (see Table 9) were statistically significant at the 95% confidence
level showing the importance of the relationship between variables. Same as the Hunter-
Schmidt chi-square and homogeneity tests were statistically significant for all subsets (see
Table 9), meaning that variation across effect sizes could not be attributed to sampling error
alone.
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Table 8: Symbolic racism x Policy type - Untransformed r
Statistic Sym by Pref. Sym by Comp. Sym by Deseg. Sym by Legal
r 0.3743 0.2418 0.2651 0.4523
sr2 0.0186 0.0067 0.0064 0.0111
Sr 0.1365 0.0816 0.0798 0.1053
2 0.0010 0.0014 0.0010 0.0009Se
N 11 939 2608 16 175 8 160
K 16 4 19 11
Average N 746 652 851 742
(J/ 0.0176 0.0053 0.0054 0.0102
(Jp 0.1328 0.0728 0.0732 0.1012
95% Lower 0.3378 0.1105 0.2526 0.4305
Con. Int. Upper 0.4108 0.2549 0.2776 0.4741
2
258.2458 18.5587 111.3451 113.8712X calc
2
24.9958 7.8147 28.8693 19.6752X crit
df 15 3 18 11
p 0.00001 0.00034 0.00001 0.00001
4.4.2 Old-fashioned racism by racial policy type
The old-fashioned racism by racial policy interaction produced some of the lowest weighted
mean correlations, all interpreted as small under Cohen's (1988, as cited in Cooper and
Lindsay, 1997) rule of thumb. The old-fashioned racism by compensatory programmes
interaction was highest within the scale with a mean of r = 0.2096, followed by old-
fashioned racism by general legal policies (r = 0.1970), then old-fashioned racism by
desegregation policies (r = 0.1732) and finally old-fashioned by preferential treatment, mean
r = 0.1115. However, all the confidence interval tests (see Table 10) were statistically
significant at all levels showing that the obtained mean correlations were significant at the
95% confidence level. See Table 10 below for detailed results. The chi-square tests were also
significant at all levels, indicating the possible presence of moderator variables.
Table 9: Symbolic racism x Policy type - Transformed Fisher Zr
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Interaction Statistic Fisher z Zr
Sym x Preferential Mean 0.4023 0.3819
Stand. Err. Ofmean 0.0092 0.0092
Z test for mean ES 43.8670 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.4203 0.3971




Sym x Compensatory Mean 0.3280 0.3167
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0170 0.0170
Z test for mean ES 19.3278 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.36128 0.3463




Sym x Desegregation Mean 0.2739 0.2673
Stand. Err. Ofmean 0.0079 0.0079
Z test for mean ES 34.7786 -
Uoper 95% Con. Int. 0.2894 0.2816




Sym x Legal Mean 0.5043 0.4655
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0111 0.0111
Z test for mean ES 45.4630 -
Upper 95% Con. Int. 0.5260 0.4824





Table 10: Old-fashioned racism x Policy type - Untransformed r
Statistic Old by Pref. Old by Comp Old by Desee:. Old by Legal
r 0.1115 0.2096 0.1732 0.1970
Sr
2 0.0115 0.0168 0.0058 0.0245
Sr 0.1 070 0.1296 0.0764 0.1564
s/ 0.0011 0.0018 0.0010 0.0013
N 12 105 4585 10783 16206
K 14 9 11 23
Average N 865 509 980 704
2 0.0103 0.0150 0.0049 0.0231aD
aD 0.1016 0.1225 0.0699 0.1522
95% Lower 0.1092 0.1767 0.1618 0.1490
Con. Int. Upper 0.1340 0.2425 0.1846 0.2450
2
140.9600 80.5675 64.4756 413.0781X calc
2
22.3620 15.5073 18.3070 33.9245X crit
df 13 8 10 22
p 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
Similar to the Hunter-Schmidt model, the fixed effects model also yielded some of the lowest
effect sizes. The old-fashioned racism by compensatory programmes interaction had the
highest mean Zr = 0.2103, followed by old-fashioned racism by general legal policies mean
Zr = 0.2035, then old-fashioned racism by desegregation policies (mean Zr = 0.1744) and
finally old-fashioned racism by preferential treatment policies, mean Zr = 0.1128. However,
despite the low mean effect sizes, all the confidence interval tests (see Table 11) were
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, indicative of a high significance of the
relationship between variables. The homogeneity test was statistically significant for all
subsets (see Table 11), meaning that variation across effect sizes could not be attributed to
sampling error alone.
Table 11: Old-fashioned racism x Policy type - Transformed Fisher Zr
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Interaction Statistic Fisher z Zr
Old x Preferential Mean 0.1133 0.1128
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0091 0.0091
Z test for mean ES 12.4441 -
Upper Con. Int. 0.1311 0.1304




Old x Compensatory Mean 0.2135 0.2103
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0148 0.0148
Z test for mean ES 14.4142 -
Upper Con. Int. 0.2425 0.2379




Old x Desegregation Mean 0.1762 0.1744
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0096 0.0096
Z test for mean ES 18.2720 -
Upper Con. Int. 0.1951 0.1927




Old x Legal Mean 0.2064 0.2035
Stand. Err. Of mean 0.0079 0.0079
Z test for mean ES 26.2213 -
Upper Con. Int. 0.2218 0.2183





4.4.3 Racial affect by racial policy type
As can be seen in Table 12, the racial affect by general legal policies interaction produced a
weighted mean correlation of r = 0.2702 (the highest within the scale), followed by racial
affect by preferential treatment (mean r = 0.1795) and finally the racial affect by
desegregation policies with a mean of r = 0.1545. The racial affect by compensatory
programmes interaction though yielded only one effect size (r = 0.19) for analysis, which was
not worth analysing. However, the confidence interval tests for all the analysed subsets (see
Table 12) were statistically significant, showing that the obtained mean correlations were
significant at the 95% confidence level. The homogeneity tests performed on each subset
were also statistically significant, indicating the presence of moderator variables. Refer to
Table 12 below for more detailed results.
Table 12: Racial affect x Policy type - Untransforrned r
Statistic Affect by Pref. Affect bv Corno Affect by Deseg. Affect by Legal
r 0.1795 0.19 0.1545 0.2702
Sr
2 0.0028 - 0.0206 0.0055
Sr 0.0532 - 0.1437 0.0743
se2 0.0010 - 0.0011 0.0015
N 4571 134 4996 4558
K 5 1 6 8
Average N 914 134 833 570
an
2 0.0018 - 0.0195 0.0040
an 0.0424 - 0.1396 0.0633
95% Lower 0.1740 - 0.1141 0.2594
Con. Int. Upper 0.1850 - 0.1949 0.2810
2
13.2249X calc - 105.4343 27.0434
2
9.4877X cri! - 11.0705 14.0671
df 4 - 5 7
P 0.01023 - 0.00001 0.00033
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Table 13: Racial affect x Policy type -Transformed Fisher Zr
Interaction Statistic Fisher z Zr
Affect x Preferential Mean 0.18202 0.1800
Stand. Err. Ofmean 0.0148 0.0148
Z test for mean ES 12.2860 -
Upper Con. Int. 0.2111 0.2080




Affect x Compensatory Mean 0.1923 0.19
Stand. Err. Of mean - -
Z test for mean ES - -
Upper Con. Int. - -




Affect x Desegregation Mean 0.1573 0.1560
Stand. Err. Ofmean 0.0142 0.0142
Z test for mean ES 11.0964 -
Upper Con. Int. 0.1851 0.1830




Affect x Legal Mean 0.2788 0.2718
Stand. Err. Ofmean 0.0149 0.01485
Z test for mean ES 18.7740 0
Upper Con. Int. 0.3079 0.2985




Using the fixed effects model, the racial affect by general legal policies interaction produced
a weighted mean correlation of Zr = 0.2718 (the highest), the racial affect by preferential
treatment interaction had the second highest mean of Zr = 0.1800 and the racial affect by
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desegregation policies the lowest mean of Zr = 0.1560. The confidence intervals for all
subsets did not include 0, indicating that the mean correlations were statistically significant at
the 95% confidence level. Since the racial affect by compensatory interaction obtained only
one correlation, it was decided that it was not worth looking further into. Just like the Hunter-
Schmidt model, the fixed effects model yielded statistically significant homogeneity tests for
all the analysed subsets. Refer to Table 13 below for details
4.4.4 Stereotypes by racial policy type
Table 14: Stereotypes x Policy type - Untransformed r
Statistic Stereo by Pref. Stereo by Deseg. Stereo by Legal
r 0.2334 0.1884 0.2712
Sr
2 0.0108 0.0041 0.0400
Sr 0.1 039 0.0637 0.1999
s/ 0.0008 0.0020 0.0008
N 6452 1 869 4342
K 6 4 4
Average N 1075 467 1085
a/ 0.0100 0.0021 0.0392
aD 0.0998 0.0454 0.1979
95% Lower 0.2122 0.1804 0.1928
Con. Int. Upper 0.2546 0.1964 0.3496
2
73.6962 7.9449 187.4682X calc
2
11.0705 7.8147 7.8147x crit
df 5 3 3
p 0.00001 0.04716 0.00001
Using the Hunter-Schmidt model, the stereotypes by general legal policies interaction had the
highest weighted mean correlation of r = 0.2712, followed by the stereotypes by preferential
treatment interaction with a mean of r = 0.2334 and lastly the stereotypes by desegregation
policies had the lowest mean of r = 0.1884. The confidence interval tests for all the subsets
(see Table 14) were statistically significant, showing that the obtained mean correlations were
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significant at the 95% confidence level. The chi-square tests for all the subsets also show
statistically significant results, indicating the presence of moderator variables. However there
were no effect sizes for analysis under the stereotypes by compensatory programmes
interaction. See Table 14 above for a more detailed analysis.
Table 15: Stereotypes x Policy type -Transformed Fisher Zr
Interaction Statistic Fisher z Zr
Stereo x Preferential Mean 0.2419 0.2373
Stand. Err. of mean 0.0125 0.0125
Z test for mean ES 19.4041 -
Upper Con. Int. 0.2663 0.2602




Stereo x Desegregation Mean 0.1916 0.1893
Stand. Err. of mean 0.0232 0.0232
Z test for mean ES 8.2550 0
Upper Con. Int. 0.237 0.2327




Stereo x Legal Mean 0.2782 0.2713
Stand. Err. of mean 0.0152 0.0152
Z test for mean ES 18.3075 0
Upper Con. Int. 0.3080 0.2986




The fixed effects model yielded results almost similar to the Hunter-Schmidt model. The
stereotypes by general policies interaction yielded the highest mean of Zr = 0.2713, followed
by the stereotypes by preferential treatment interaction (mean Zr = 0.2373) and finally
86
stereotypes by desegregation with the lowest mean of Zr = 0.1893. The confidence interval
tests for all subsets (see Table 15) were statistically significant, indicating the presence of a
significant relationship between the variables at the 95% confidence level. The homogeneity
tests were significant for both methods (except for the fixed effects models' stereotypes by
general legal policies interaction), showing that there are moderator variables present. See
Table 15 below for more details.




Prior research has shown that although people support the eradication of racial inequality in
principle, they fail to support practical steps implemented so as to achieve this particular goal
(hence the previously discussed 'principle-implementation gap'). Consequently, the question
in most researchers' minds is from where does this particular gap originate.
This meta-analytic study managed to answer one question very well, among others, that it is
not a matter of whether or not racism still exists; rather we should be asking ourselves to
what extend it influences racial policy attitudes. From the overall meta-analysis results (r =
0.2263, Zr = 0.2303), it is clear that racial prejudice does indeed play a significant role in
shaping people's racial policy attitudes, confirming the racism theorists' argument that racism
still exists and it influences politics, public attitudes and behaviour. Also of note is the fact
that these results were statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, validating the
claim that racial prejudice influences people's attitudes towards racial policies. Furthermore
each form of racism plays its own part, to a certain extend, in influencing this relationship.
All the subgroups analysed yielded positive correlations, clearly indicating that a relationship
does exist between race prejudice and racial policy attitudes.
5.2 Racial attitudes
Whilst symbolic racism theorists argue that a new form of racism (symbolic racism) has
emerged and that it is now the main force behind the racial policy attitudes, some researchers
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are convinced that it is the traditional form of prejudice (old-fashioned racism) that is still
influencing people's racial policy attitudes and yet again, others argue that there are non-
racial explanations for people's attitudes (e.g., political conservatism). In this meta-analysis,
both analyses methods, the Hunter-Schmidt and fixed effects models, yielded stronger
(compared to other race attitudes) positive correlations between symbolic racism and racial
policy attitudes, confirming symbolic racism theorists' (e.g. Kinder, McConahay and Sears)
argument that symbolic racism holds more influence than any other racial attitude. Using
Cohen's rule ofthumb for interpretation, the mean effect sizes (r = 0.3218, Zr = 0.3282) were
medium demonstrating an important role played by this form of racism.
These results could be explained along the line of the symbolic racism theorists' argument
that the greater endorsement of symbolic racism by whites today can be attributed to its
subtlety in nature, which makes it more acceptable in a world where blatant racism is
frowned upon as unfashionable. Moreover, racism is now considered illegal, probably
deterring racists from publicly showing their true feelings and beliefs. Therefore, those
feelings and beliefs have now been displaced and projected into hatred or dislike for
'symbols' such as affirmative action programmes (e.g., racial quotas in sport or at work,
among others) that are perceived as giving an unfair advantage to undeserving individuals.
Another notable point is the argument that when whites believe racism no longer exists,
which seems to be the contemporary belief, they tend to oppose race-targeted policies more,
since they believe blacks are getting more than they deserve.
Whereas symbolic racism is subtle and disguised, old-fashioned racism tends to be more
blatant and transparent, which basically accounts for its unpopularity in today's society, and
hence the low correlations associated with it. This argument corresponds with the meta-
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analysis results (old-fashioned racism scale mean r = 0.1722, mean Zr = 0.1753). These
effect sizes are very low in magnitude (although significant) compared to those that were
obtained with the symbolic racism scale - almost half the effect size as symbolic racism,
substantiating symbolic theorists' argument. For reasons previously noted, not many people
would publicly show themselves today as racist, which could explain the low averages
yielded using this scale.
Importantly, the obtained results (for both symbolic and old-fashioned racism) help to refute,
beyond doubt - on an empirical basis - old-fashioned racism advocates' (e.g., Sniderman &
Tetlock, 1986a, 1986b) argument that it is indeed old-fashioned racism that is still
influencing racial policy attitudes today. The results show that although old-fashioned racism
is still prevalent and plays some role in shaping racial policy attitudes, it no longer plays a
prominent role like before, rather, it has taken a back seat and it is symbolic racism that now
plays the dominant role in shaping racial policy attitudes.
Not surprisingly, the racial affect scale obtained significant results (r = 0.1914, Zr = 0.1932),
which is in line with previous research findings (e.g., Bobo, 1983; Bobo & Zubrinsky, 1996;
Durrheim, 2003; Sears and Henry, 2003; Sears et aI., 1997). Racial affect is associated with
negative feelings towards the beneficiaries of racial policies, and subsequently, the actual
opposition to particular racial policies. In other words, the more negative the feelings towards
the beneficiary group, the higher the probability of opposition towards racial policies. Racial
affect is also believed to underlie both symbolic and old-fashioned racism but can be
measured separately, typically using the popular 'feeling thermometer' (see Chapter 2 for a
more detailed explanation). The obtained results in the present study substantiate the
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argument that anti-black sentiment still exists in society today and it plays a significant role
in motivating whites' racial policy attitudes.
The stereotypes scale obtained substantial mean effect sizes (r = 0.2515, Zr = 0.2545),
corroborating previous findings (see Bobo & Zubrinsky, 1996; Sears et aI., 1997; Jacobson,
1985, among others). Stereotypes are generally negative characterisationslbeliefs about other
groups (e.g., blacks are less intelligent than whites) without proper information to validate
such beliefs. Stereotypes are believed to underlie, particularly, old-fashioned racism but can
still be measured separately. The results from the meta-analysis are indicative of the
continuing existence of racism, with whites still holding negative views towards blacks and
their behaviour, which in turn influences their attitudes towards policies designed to help
them. As Kluegel and Smith (1983) stated, if whites believe that blacks are less well off
because they are too lazy to change their low status (for example), they are likely to view
race-targeted policies as unnecessary, thus the opposition to such policies.
5.3 Racial policy type
Previous research suggests that some racial policies are more strongly opposed than others
depending on the actual policy type. For example, if people think one group is getting special
treatment over another, they tend to oppose, but are more supportive when policies are
viewed as helping a disadvantaged group without discriminating towards another. The
available literature indicates that preferential treatment policies seem to have the highest level
of opposition, with compensatory policies on the other extreme end and general legal policies
receiving intermediate support.
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According to Kravitz and Klineberg (2004), however, it makes sense that people, racist or
not, tend to support general legal policies that promote equality, mainly because there is no
justification for opposition. On the other extreme end, opposition is high for policies viewed
as benefiting one group over another, whether or not the respondents are racist. However, it is
when people oppose intermediate (or compensatory) programmes that can be attributed to
racism. For example, if a white person opposes a government programme that promotes
granting Higher Education scholarships to qualified or 'deserving' Black persons, that
opposition can be attributed to racism since there is no reasonable justification for such an
attitude.
In the present study, the preferential treatment policies mean effect sizes obtained using both
the Hunter-Schmidt and fixed effects model (r = 0.2132, Zr = 0.2180) were statistically
significant, representing a strong correlation between this variable and racism. Following
Kravitz and Klineberg's (2004) argument, it makes sense that preferential treatment is
significantly correlated with race attitudes. As said before, preferential treatment policies are
often perceived as giving special treatment to one group, usually at the cost of another (e.g.,
hiring a black person instead of a more qualified white person so as to promote a racial equity
or an employment equity programme). The results lend substance to the argument that
sometimes it is not racism that leads people to oppose race-targeted policies; rather, it is a
'rebellion' against the unfairness of such policies that leads people to oppose them.
However, contrary to available literature, general legal policies obtained very strong
correlations (r = 0.2395, Zr = 0.2456). Whereas this could be a genuine indication of the
status of affairs, it could also be a result of the fact that a considerable number of effect sizes
collected for analyses fell under general legal policies. This category is generally criticised
92
for its ambiguity or vagueness. Scholars (such as Kravitz and Klineberg, 2004; Tuch and
Hughes, 1996) argue that researchers, when doing surveys, often fail to clearly define what
they mean by 'race-targeted policies', or 'equal opportunity policies', or specifically
'affirmative action', for example. It is argued that because individuals understand affirmative
action differently, how do we know for sure what is it that participants are actually evaluating
when they are simply asked to give their opinions towards it? Affirmative action is one
solution to one huge problem, racism; and to one person it may translate to preferential
treatment given to blacks by the government, whereas to another it simply means "helping
blacks help themselves" (e.g., by awarding them college scholarships). In another words,
depending on the respondent, a racial policy may be understood in preferential or
compensatory terms, influencing how one responses and this division is often obscured by
unspecified racial policies or general questions.
Importantly, compensatory policies effect sizes were significant (r = 0.2091, Zr = 0.2109),
suggesting the existence of a strong relationship between this policy type and racism.
According to Kravitz and Klineberg (2004), it is prejudiced individuals who are highly likely
to oppose opportunity enhancement policies (compensatory policies), and non-prejudiced
individuals who are likely to support them since they primarily enhance a target group's
opportunities without harming the non-target groups'. Therefore, following this line of
reasoning, one can conclude from the results that racism still is very much prevalent and
plays a significant role in influencing racial policy attitudes.
Desegregation policies (mean r = 0.2204, mean Zr = 0.2215) in the present study were
categorised as policies that involved busing (for school desegregation) (McConahay's 1982
study), and fair housing laws (for residential desegregation). McConahay (1982) argued that
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whites do not oppose busing because they are protecting their own interests and their
children's (as self-interest theorists would argue), rather opposition is predicted by racial
attitudes (particularly symbolic racism). In terms of residential integration, Bobo &
Zubrinsky's 1996 study found that opposition is often influenced by negative beliefs or
stereotypes that one group holds about another. For example, if whites believe that blacks are
noisy and violent, they are highly unlikely to be receptive of the idea of having blacks in their
neighbourhoods, hence opposition towards fair housing laws that promote integration.
5.4 Racial attitudes by racial policy type
As a matter of interest, further analyses were done exploring the relationship between racial
prejudice and racial policy types, with the interaction considered a moderator variable.
Overall, all obtained mean correlations were positive and significant indicating a strong effect
of each level of race attitudes on each level racial policy types. Predictably, at all levels, the
symbolic racism by racial policy type interaction produced some of the highest mean effect
sizes (see Table 7), confirming earlier findings that symbolic racism plays a dominant role in
influencing racial policy attitudes than any other form of racism. It is interesting to note
though that the symbolic racism by racial policy type effects were not really identical as
Sears and Henry (2005) suggested. Whereas, the correlation between general legal policies
was fairly large, the others were small to medium.
The old-fashioned racism by racial policy interaction, on the other hand, produced some of
the weakest correlations, which was in line with the argument that this form of racism is no
longer plays a dominant role in influencing policy attitudes. Even combined with different
racial policies, it still does not appear very strong. Therefore one may be compelled to agree
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with Sears and colleagues that old-fashioned racism has essentially lost its power to motivate
public opinions on political matters, among other things.
Finally, both the racial affect by racial policy type and stereotypes by racial policy
interactions yielded significant results. This validates the argument that negative affect and
stereotypical beliefs about other groups (often negative) play a significant part in influencing
attitudes towards race-targeted policies. The more negative those feelings or beliefs are, the
more likely it is that individuals oppose these policies.
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6. CONCLUSION
To summarise, one very important factor that came out of this meta-analytic study is the fact
that racial attitudes play a significant role in shaping people's attitudes towards race-targeted
policies. This confirms the argument that although racism may have decreased (as research
suggests), it has not completely disappeared; it is still very much prevalent and it is
influencing public attitudes, politics and behaviour.
The fact that symbolic racism plays a dominant role also confirms symbolic racism theorists'
argument that racism has now taken a new form and become more subtle and inconspicuous,
where it was blatant and transparent before. In that vein, whites now express their racist
sentiment in more "acceptable" ways, e.g., by arguing that race-targeted policies promote
'reverse discrimination' or arguing in terms of the 'deservingness' of the group beneficiaries.
Such attitudes, according to symbolic racism theorists, allow them to express their underlying
racial prejudice without actually appearing racist.
Nonetheless, one should keep in mind that there may also be other possible non-racial
explanations, to a certain extend, influencing attitudes towards racial policies. Looking at the
role played by the specific types of racial policies people were responding to when surveys
were being done, it shows that these policies also play an important role in influencing
people's decisions on whether or not to support them. Therefore, from the meta-analyst's
point of view both these factors (racial and non-racial explanations) should be considered as
possible answers to the famous 'principle-implementation gap'.
Interestingly, it was apparent that there is substance in the argument that the Fisher z
correlation transformation has a tendency to be biased upwards, and conversely, the
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untransformed correlation is more conservative and yields averages that are lower than would
be expected. From the tables in the Results chapter, it is clear that almost (if not all) averages
obtained after analysing data using the Fisher Zr were higher than those obtained using the
untransformed correlation (r). Importantly though, while the figures were different in
magnitude, they were similar in direction. Therefore at the end of the day, it did not really
make a difference which model (Hunter-Schmidt or fixed effects) was used for analyses,
which was also in line with what Hunter and Schmidt said that in practice it does not really
matter whether you use the untransformed r or the transformed Zr.
6.1 Limitations
In view of the fact that only one unpublished study was used for analysis, this could have
resulted in correlations being biased upwards. In addition to contacting authors for both
published and unpublished papers, a variety of sources were used (including Journals,
textbooks, CD-ROMS, study reference lists and the Internet) so as to ensure that as many
relevant studies as possible were included. In the end, the same references kept on 'coming
up' when using different sources, suggesting a certain degree of sampling redundancy.
Nonetheless, even though an effort was made to collect as many relevant articles as possible
and to control for the file drawer problem, it is important to keep in mind that there are no
guarantees that there were not any other relevant studies that were omitted in this review.
It is also important to point out the fact that the present meta-analysis did not take into
account many other factors (e.g., political conservatism, individualism, self and group
interest), some of which may decrease the unique explanatory value of race attitudes. This
also precludes the possibility of making comparisons with race-neutral factors so as to find
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out if racism, particularly symbolic racism is now playing the central role in shaping racial
policy attitudes as claimed by Sears and colleagues, or if other factors now influence policy
attitudes (as claimed by Sniderman and colleagues).
Due to lack of enough information, e.g., reliability of scales data and standard deviations, to
correct/control for all artefactual error (especially measurement error and range restriction),
there is a possibility that results may have been affected. However, the meta-analyst has no
knowledge of the extent to which this problem might have affected the final outcome.
Finally, since the meta-analyst had to manually add-in the relevant formulas used to analyse
data, there is potential for calculation error. However, an effort was made to double-check all
formulas and calculations. Where figures did not seem to fit or make sense, a step-by-step
recalculation was done in order to ensure that that particular figure was not a result of any
error made on the part of the meta-analyst.
6.2 Recommendations
Following the argument put forward by Sniderman and Tetlock (1986a, 1986b), among
others, further meta-analysis studies are needed to look at the validity and reliability of the
scales used to measure prejudice. It is also recommended that intercorrelations among the
measures of prejudice (e.g., the symbolic racism and old-fashioned racism scales) be
investigated further to see if there are real distinctions between or among them.
Finally, another meta-analytic study including other factors such as political conservatism,
self- and group-interest, and beliefs about inequality, to name a few, is needed to determine
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how race attitudes would perform against them. It would also serve to answer some of the
questions being currently debated on by researchers, for example, the dominance of symbolic
racism in motivating racial policy attitudes.
To conclude, the present meta-analysis shows that racism is still an issue that needs attention,
and needs to be dealt with. Even in countries like the United States of America where
principles of racial integration, equity and equality of opportunity were introduced over half a
century ago, racism is still a problem. Looking at it from a more local context, although in
South Africa racial actions and racially discriminatory laws were outlawed more recently and
the extend of the continuing existence of racism is unknown for sure, the trends will probably
follow the same pattern as in America. Therefore, the measures put into practice currently
(e.g. AffIrmative Action and Employment Equity programmes) probably need to be
monitored closely for progress and more still needs to be done to control for the problem.
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Appendix 1: Studies included in the meta-analysis (with the original 216 effect sizes)
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Measure of
Racial policy racial Statistic Sample
Author (s) Year type prejudice r Size
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. 1983 Compensatory Symbolic 0.31 1596
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. Preferential Symbolic 0.26 1596
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. Preferential Symbolic 0.22 1596
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. Preferential Symbolic 0.18 1596
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. Compensatory Symbolic 0.09 1596
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. Preferential Symbolic 0.06 1596
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. Preferential Symbolic 0.06 1596
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. Preferential Symbolic 0.07 1596
Federico, M. F. & Sidanius, J. 2002 Compensatory Old-fashioned -0.25 209
Federico, M. F. & Sidanius, J. Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.27 222
Federico, M. F. & Sidanius, J. Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.17 318
Federico, M. F. & Sidanius, J. Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.29 538
Durrheim, K. 2003 Preferential Old-fashioned 0.43 134
Durrheim, K. Preferential Symbolic 0.32 134
Durrheim, K. Preferential Affect 0.14 134
Durrheim, K. Legal Old-fashioned 0.48 134
Durrheim, K. Legal Symbolic 0.112 134
Durrheim, K. Legal Affect 0.21 134
Durrheim, K. Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.45 134
Durrheim, K. Compensatory Symbolic 0.24 134
Durrheim, K. Compensatory Affect 0.19 134
Konrad, A. M. & Spitz, J. 2003 Legal Old-fashioned 0.55 405
Konrad, A. M. & Spitz, J. Legal Old-fashioned 0.54 405
Mcconahay, J. B. 1982 Desegregation Symbolic 0.51 879
Mcconahay,J.B. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.36 879
Mcconahay, J. B. Desegregation Affect -0.15 879
[Arriola, K. R. J. & Cole, E. R 2001 Compensatory Symbolic 0.11 175
Arriola, K. R. J. & Cole, E. R Preferential Symbolic -0.06 175
Arriola, K. R. J. & Cole, E. R Legal Symbolic 0.19 175
Nosworthy, G. J., Lea, J. A. & Lindsay, R. Symbolic
c.L. 1995 Preferential 0.36 47
Nosworthy, G. J., Lea, J. A. & Lindsay, R. Symbolic
C. L. Preferential 0.26 46
lNosworthy, G. J., Lea, J. A. & Lindsay, R. Symbolic
C.L. Preferential 0.13 44
Tuch, S. A. & Hughes, M. 1996 Legal Old-fashioned 0.221 392
Tuch, S. A. & Hughes, M. Legal Old-fashioned 0.352 374
Tuch, S. A. & Hughes, M. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.038 606
Tuch, S. A. & Hughes, M. Legal Old-fashioned 0.206 625
James, E.H., Brief, A. P., Dietz, J. &
Cohen, R. R. 2001 Preferential Symbolic 0.27 600
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. 1996 Desegregation Affect 0.25 625
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.16 625
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Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.19 625
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.25 483
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.17 483
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.28 483
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.26 477
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.3 477
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.27 477
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.32 284
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.36 284
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Affect 0.18 284
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.12 625
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.17 625
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.08 625
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.31 483
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.19 483
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.35 483
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.29 477
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.11 477
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.21 477
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.25 284
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.08 284
Bobo, L. & Zubrinsky, C. L. Desegregation Stereotypes 0.11 284
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. 2003 Preferential Symbolic 0.58 267
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Symbolic 0.42 267
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Preferential Old-fashioned -0.1 267
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Old-fashioned 0.04 267
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Symbolic 0.35 223
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Preferential Symbolic 0.34 223
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Symbolic 0.29 223
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Affect 0.04 223
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Preferential Affect 0.01 223
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Affect -0.01 223
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Affect 0.27 284
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Affect 0.32 284
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Affect 0.03 284
Sears, D. O. & Henry, P. J. Legal Affect 0.07 284
Bobo, L. 1983 Desegregation Symbolic 0.263 2705
Bobo, L. Desegregation Symbolic 0.215 2705
Bobo, L. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.116 2705
Bobo, L. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.18 2705
Bobo, L. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.127 2705
Bobo, L. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.165 2705
Bobo, L. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.142 2705
Bobo, L. Desegregation Symbolic 0.168 2705
Bobo, L. Desegregation Symbolic 0.269 2248
Bobo, L. Desegregation Affect 0.22 2248
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Bobo, L. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.184 2248
Bobo, L. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.094 2248
Bobo, L. Desegregation Affect 0.181 2248
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. 1997 Legal Symbolic 0.57 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Affect 0.28 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Old-fashioned 0.21 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Symbolic 0.49 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Affect 0.28 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Stereotypes 0.25 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Symbolic 0.54 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Affect 0.33 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Old-fashioned 0.12 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Symbolic 0.54 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Affect 0.31 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Stereotypes 0.29 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Symbolic 0.47 2364
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Stereotypes 0.27 2364
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Legal Old-fashioned 0.35 2364
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Symbolic 0.43 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carri1I0, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Affect 0.2 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Old-fashioned -0.04 1806
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Symbolic 0.45 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Affect 0.21 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Stereotypes 0.17 1794
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Symbolic 0.44 2364
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Stereotypes 0.18 2364
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. & Preferential Old-fashioned 0.15 2364
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Kosterman, R. c?
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential Symbolic 0.42 262
Sears, D. 0., van Laar, C, Carrillo, M. &
Kosterman, R. Preferential StereotYPes 0.22 262
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. & Bobo, L. 1996 Legal Old-fashioned 0.27 386
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. & Bobo, L. Legal Old-fashioned 0.0 678
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. & Bobo, L. Legal Old-fashioned 0.14 812
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. & Bobo, L. Legal Old-fashioned -0.07 919
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. & Bobo, L. Legal Old-fashioned 0.28 926
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. & Bobo, L. Legal Old-fashioned 0.62 511
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. & Bobo, L. Preferential Affect 0.1 614
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. & Bobo, L. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.19 614
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. 1997 Legal Old-fashioned 0.2 1118
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Legal Old-fashioned 0.16 1118
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.16 1118
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Legal Old-fashioned 0.12 1118
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.05 1118
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Legal Old-fashioned 0.22 755
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Legal Old-fashioned 0.18 755
Sniderman, P. M. & Garmines, E. G. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.17 1472
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Compensatory Old-fashioned ·0.22 1472
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Legal Old-fashioned 0.28 1472
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.12 1472
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Legal Old-fashioned 0.15 1472
Sniderman, P. M. & Carmines, E. G. Legal Old-fashioned 0.11 1472
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T 1993 Preferential Symbolic 0.24 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Preferential Symbolic 0.23 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Preferential Old-fashioned 0.2 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Preferential Old-fashioned 0.15 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Preferential Old-fashioned 0.1 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Preferential Old-fashioned 0.04 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Compensatory Symbolic 0.39 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Compensatory Symbolic 0.35 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.26 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.14 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.12 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.09 703
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Symbolic 0.14 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Symbolic 0.18 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.22 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.18 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.14 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.11 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation .Symbolic 0.11 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Symbolic 0.18 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation oId-fashioned 0.2 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.06 722
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Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.07 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.08 722
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Legal Symbolic 0.33 698
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Legal Symbolic 0.3 698
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Legal Old-fashioned 0.25 698
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Legal Old-fashioned 0.1 698
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Legal Old-fashioned 0.11 698
Sniderman, P. M. & Piazza, T Legal Old-fashioned 0.08 698
Jacobson, C. K. 1985 Preferential Symbolic 0.38 1140
Jacobson, C. K. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.28 1140
Jacobson, C. K. Preferential Stereotypes 0.3 1140
Little, B. L., Murry, W. D. & Wimbush, J.
C. 1998 Preferential Symbolic 0.61 738
Kravitz, D. A 1995 Legal Symbolic 0.31 175
McClendon, M. J. 1985 Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.03 161
McClendon, M. J. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.03 161
McClendon, M. J. Desegregation Symbolic 0.23 161
McClendon, M. J. Desegregation Symbolic 0.24 161
Giles, M. W., Gatlin, D. S. & Cataldo, E. F. 1976 Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.085 845
Giles, M. W., Gatlin, D. S. & Cataldo, E. F. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.182 161
Giles, M. W., Gatlin, D. S. & Cataldo, E. F. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.208 289
Giles, M. W., Gatlin, D. S. & Cataldo, E. F. Desegregation Old-fashioned -0.015 214
Giles, M. W., Gatlin, D. S. & Cataldo, E. F. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.189 450
Kinder, D. R. & Sears, D. 0 1981 Desegregation Symbolic 0.33 198
Kinder, D. R. & Sears, D. 0 Desegregation Symbolic 0.39 239
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. 1984 Desegregation Symbolic 0.26 817
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.26 723
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.27 768
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.23 1045
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.27 1325
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.15 1116
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.34 643
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.3 638
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.36 639
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.31 512
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.24 506
Sears, D. O. & Alien, H. M, Jr. Desegregation Symbolic 0.18 291
Gilens, M. 1995 Legal Symbolic 0.29 391
Gilens, M. Legal Old-fashioned -0.06 391
Gatlin, D. S., Giles, M. W. and Cataldo, E.
F. 1978 Desegregation Old-fashioned -0.096 2109
Gatlin, D. S., Giles, M. W. and Cataldo, E.
F. Desegregation Old-fashioned 0.57 2109
Henry, P. J., Reyna, C. & Weiner, B. 2004 Legal Symbolic 0.26 133
Henry, P. J., Reyna, C. & Weiner, B. Legal Affect 0.15 133
Reyna, C., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. 2006 Preferential Old-fashioned 0.258 500
Reyna, c., Henry, P. 1. & Tucker, A. Preferential Stereotypes 0.551 500
Reyna, C., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. Preferential Old-fashioned -0.027 392
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Reyna, C., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. Preferential Stereotypes 0.255 392
Reyna, C., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. Legal Old-fashioned 0.142 134
Reyna, c., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. Legal Stereotypes 0.344 134
Reyna, C., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. Legal Affect 0.345 134
Reyna, c., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. Legal Old-fashioned -0.092 50
Reyna, c., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. Legal Stereotypes 0.172 50
Reyna, c., Henry, P. J. & Tucker, A. Legal Affect 0.096 50
Kravitz, D. A. & Klineberg, S. L. 2004 Legal Old-fashioned -0.07 154
Kravitz, D. A. & Klineberg, S. L. Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.55 154
Kravitz, D. A. & Klineberg, S. L. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.19 154
Kravitz, D. A. & Klineberg, S. L. Legal Old-fashioned 0.03 835
Kravitz, D. A. & Klineberg, S. L. Compensatory Old-fashioned 0.2 835
Kravitz, D. A. & Klineberg, S. L. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.03 835
Kravitz, D. A. & Klineberg, S. L. Preferential Old-fashioned 0.0 835
Note: This table does not include all the variables coded during the data collection phase.
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Appendix 2: Authors contacted and letter send to authors
Appendix 2.1: Letter send to authors
Dear (Authors's name)
I am doing a meta-analytic study of the relationship between measures of racial prejudice
(symbolic racism, old-fashioned racism, stereotypes and racial affect) and measures of racial
policy attitudes (e.g., affirmative action, compensatory policies, etc). On the basis of data
base searches I have identified n = 24 articles that have at least one measure of each construct
(See the attached list of articles). In an effort to counter the file drawer problem, I am
contacting all authors that have published in the field - including yourself - requesting help
to update my reference list. Do you know of any research by yourself or others, published or
unpublished that has investigated the relationship between racial prejudice and racial policy
opinion? Please forward the references or (preferably) a word/PDF file of the research report.
I would really appreciate any help you can give.
Many thanks
Patience Matizamhuka
Appendix 2.2: List of authors contacted
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Author E-mail address(es) used
lbobormstanford.edu; bobo@wjh.harvard.edu;
Bobo, L. lbobo@ucla.edu
Brief, A. P. artbriefuv.mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu; artbrief@tulane.edu
Carmines, E. G. carmines@indiana.edu
Mary.Carrillo@gwmail.maricopa.edu;
Carrillo, M. carrillo@Qatewavcc.edu
Cataldo, E. F. cataldouv.csuohio.edu
Cohen, R. R. R.Cohen@warwick.ac.uk
Cole, E. R ecole@umich.edu; cole@colbv.edu
Federico, M. F. federico@umn.edu
Gilens, M. mQilensuv.nrinceton.edu
Giles, M. W., mo-iles@emorv.edu




~acob-Arriola,K. R. J. kiacob@snh.emorv.edu
~ames, E. H. JamesE{[j)darden.vifQ:inia.edu
Kinder, D. R. drkinder@umich.edu
Kluegel, J. R. liklueQel{[j)staff.uiuc.edu
Konrad, A. M. akonrad@ivev.uwo.ca
Kosterman, R. rickkrmu.washincton.edu
Kravitz, D. A. dkravitz@Q1l1u.edu
~ysan, M. krvsan@uic.edu
~ames H. Kuklinski kuklinski@uiuc.edu
ILea, J. A. 'learmnavlov.nsvc.aueensu.ca
lLindsay, R. C. L. lindsavruv'nsvc.quensu.ca
Murry, W. D. m ytiibinQhamton.edu
lNosworthy, G. J., biznQ:@nus.edu.sQ:
Piazza, T. Ipiazza@csm.berkelev.edu
Pratto, F. felicia. nratto@uconn.edu
Sears, D. 0 sears@issr.ucla.edu
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Sidanius, J. \ Sidanius{@psvch.uc1a.edu
Smith, E. R. esmith402indiana.edu
Sniderman, P. M. oaulms02stanford.edu
Sent through website:
http://www.strose/Current Students and Faculty/emai
Spitz, J. l.aso?id=2690
Tetlock, P. E. Tetlock.l {@osu.edu; tetlock{@haas.berkelev.edu
Tuch, S. A. steven.tuch{@gwu.edu
van Laar, C. cvlaar{@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Wimbush, J. C. liwimbush{@indiana.edu
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Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics, scatter plot, histogram and stem-and-leaf plots
Descriptive Statistics (for the raw (unweighted and unaveraged) correlations)
Std.
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Deviation Variance







Descriptive Statistics (for the raw (unweighted and averaged) correlations)
Maximu Std.
N Minimum m Sum Mean Deviation Variance
Statistic r 75 -.25 .62 16.74 .2232 .13232 .018
Sample size
75 44.00 2705.00 49677.00 662.3600 567.18765
321701.8
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